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ABSTRACT 
The United States has struggled to define and implement effective integration for 
immigrants because the immigration and integration systems are unwieldy and 
confusing. This thesis analyzes case studies at the national and local levels to 
determine what elements constitute effective integration policy. A rubric was 
created using the International Organization of Migration’s definition of 
integration and the European Union’s guiding principles to analyze and grade each 
case study. The rubric helped to rate the following elements: employment, education, 
and equal access to services; respect for cultures; and communication and participation. 
Each case study received scores for these elements on a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 
representing complete integration of immigrants in the host country. This thesis finds 
that the integration process never ends; the more stakeholders who engage in the 
integration process, the better; and re-evaluating programs and policies after a certain 
period is crucial. These findings support the following recommendations for local 
leaders in the United States: 1) create an integration curriculum for new immigrants 
and continue the integration program even after the course’s completion, 2) engage 
with as many stakeholders as early and as often as possible, and 3) understand 
that integration policy is continuous and requires constant improvement to ensure 
integration in the community. 
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Defining and understanding effective integration of immigrants at the local level 
continues to be a delicate issue across the United States. Since its founding, the United 
States has welcomed immigrants to build a better life, but doing so is often a difficult and 
confusing process for both the immigrants and the communities in which they live. The 
national approach to immigration has a clearly defined goal: naturalization or citizenship.1 
However, integration in the United States entails more than a path to citizenship because 
at the local level, integration policy attempts to address every aspect of an immigrant’s life, 
not just immigration status. For example, the local policies often dictate what types of 
identification cards are accepted in a locality or whether an interpreter will be available at 
a government-run facility.2 Although federal laws govern immigration and affect the 
immigrants trying to enter the United States, decisions at the local level determine the daily 
experiences of immigrants and the native-born population. Therefore, local-level 
integration policies have a greater impact on a larger percentage of the population than 
admission decisions at the border and are crucial in forming a community identity and 
spurring economic growth in any given area of the United States. 
Immigration policy and its enforcement are hot-button issues in the United States 
today. The integration of immigrants permeates immigration policy in the nation. The 
federal government makes decisions about who to admit into the United States: this 
constitutes immigration policy. Once someone enters the United States, local leaders must 
figure out what to do with that person, how the person fits in the community, and how the 
community treats the person: this constitutes integration policy. This thesis analyzes 
several approaches to integration and presents recommendations for local leaders in the 
United States to better facilitate immigrant integration. 
 
1 “10 Steps to Naturalization,” Citizenship and Immigration Services, last modified November 13, 
2020, https://www.uscis.gov/citizenship/learn-about-citizenship/10-steps-to-naturalization. 
2 Theo Majka and Jamie Longazel, “Becoming Welcoming: Organizational Collaboration and 
Immigrant Integration in Dayton, Ohio,” Public Integrity 19, no. 2 (2017): 151–63, https://doi.org/10.
1080/10999922.2016.1256697. 
xiv 
This thesis also assesses a common issue with studies of integration—how to define 
and measure integration. This thesis examines integration holistically by analyzing several 
case studies using a widely accepted definition, the European Union’s guiding principles, 
and quantitative and qualitative data.3 Immigration and integration are a shared burden in 
the United States among federal and local government, non-governmental organizations, 
local law enforcement, and citizens at large. Several case studies distill different 
experiences into recommendations for local leaders in the United States. 
This thesis conducts a comparative analysis of existing foreign (national level) and 
U.S. (local level) immigration integration policies to assess policy options for improving 
the promotion of immigrant integration into the United States. Specifically, this thesis 
examines national and local approaches through case studies of the Netherlands, Canada, 
Singapore, and Dayton, Ohio. These countries and localities have all taken different 
approaches and enacted different laws to encourage or discourage the integration of 
immigrants. These cases were chosen because each enacted policy at the local level that 
influenced integration in that area and the surrounding areas. 
This thesis adopts the International Organization of Migration’s definition of 
integration: “the process of mutual adaptation between the host society and the migrants 
themselves, both as individuals and as groups.”4 To measure how successful each of these 
countries and localities has been at integration, this thesis uses the Common Basic 
Principles for Immigrant Integration, adopted and published by the Council of Justice and 
Home Affairs of the European Union in November 2004.5 This thesis groups the 11 
principles thematically into three broader categories: employment, education, and equal 
 
3 International Organization for Migration, “IOM and Migrant Integration” (Geneva, Switzerland: 
International Organization for Migration, 2012), https://www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-
Do/docs/IOM-DMM-Factsheet-LHD-Migrant-Integration.pdf; Council of the European Union, “2618th 
Council Meeting” (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2004), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/82745.pdf; “Integration Scoreboard: Canada,” Compare Your 
Country, accessed May 26, 2020, https://www1.compareyourcountry.org/indicators-of-immigrant-
integration/en/0/all/default/all/CAN. 
4 International Organization for Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion: Key Elements for Reaping 
the Benefits of Migration (Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration, 2017), 1, 
https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ODG/GCM/IOM-Thematic-Paper-Integration-and-Social-
Cohesion.pdf. 
5 Council of the European Union, “2618th Council Meeting.” 
xv 
access to services; respect for cultures; and communication and participation. Each case 
study is scored on a 1-5 scale in each category based on how well they address these 
principles in policies and programs. 
The first finding is that the integration process is ongoing. If integration is 
considered complete, either party can disengage, and the communication can slow or stop, 
thus causing the end of mutual adaptation. The next finding is that the more stakeholders 
who engage in the integration process, the better. In other words, the more stakeholders 
involved, the more communication and adaptation between parties. The final finding 
establishes that a re-evaluation of program and policies after a certain period is crucial. 
This re-evaluation is the type of two-way communication and mutual adaptation that 
creates an effective system of integration. 
Based on these findings, this study makes the following recommendations to local 
leaders in the United States, while acknowledging challenges that local leaders may face 
because of the way the U.S. immigration system is structured: 
1. Create an integration curriculum for new immigrants and a continuing 
integration program for those who have completed the first curriculum. 
2. Engage with as many stakeholders as possible as early and often as 
possible. 
3. Be clear that integration policy continues in the locality, requiring a 
constant improvement process to make the locality the best it can be. 
By implementing these recommendations, local leaders could be more effective at 
integrating immigrants and, in turn, creating a better community for all to live. 
xvi 
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Defining and understanding the integration of immigrants at the local level 
continues to be a delicate issue across the United States. Since its founding, the United 
States has welcomed immigrants to build a better life, but doing so is often a difficult and 
confusing process for both the immigrants and the communities in which they live. The 
national approach to integration has a clearly defined goal of citizenship. However, 
integration in the United States entails more than a path to citizenship because at the local 
level, integration policy attempts to address every aspect of an immigrant’s life, not just 
immigration status. For example, the local policies often dictate the social benefits 
available and the type of economic opportunities in a given area for an immigrant. 
Although federal laws govern immigration, decisions at the local level determine the daily 
experiences of immigrants. 
Immigration policy and its enforcement are hot-button issues in the United States 
today. The integration of immigrants permeates immigration policy in the nation. On the 
one hand, the federal government makes decisions about who to admit into the United 
States: this constitutes immigration policy. On the other hand, once someone enters the 
United States, local leaders must decide what to do with that person, how the person fits in 
the community, and how the community treats the person: this constitutes integration 
policy. Through the use of case studies, this thesis analyzes the integration policies and 
practices of several localities to provide recommendations for local leaders in the United 
States to better facilitate immigrant integration. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What constitute the elements of effective integration of immigrants at the local 
level? 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review examines the academic debates on several different aspects 
of integration in an effort to streamline terms and unpack the nuanced language used by 
2 
different scholars to describe theories of integration. The literature in this review comes 
from peer-reviewed articles from scholarly sources in the fields of sociology and 
immigration policy. The sources are balanced or self-identify biases and address them 
throughout the writings. 
A large body of literature opines that integration of immigrants into “American” 
culture begins at a local, or even individual, level. Newman and Johnson hypothesize that 
race and the economy’s health drive attitudes on immigrants, immigration, and 
integration.1 These two underlying themes emerge in almost all of the studies on 
motivations for expanding or restricting immigration. Newman and Johnson’s piece on the 
immigration backlash theory does the best job of boiling down the issue and its evolution. 
Newman and Johnson posit that during economic downturns in the United States, attitudes 
of the non-immigrant American population toward immigrants sour because of a perceived 
loss of opportunity for the non-immigrant American.2 This anti-immigrant attitude 
permeates American society and affects immigration nationally, not to mention integration 
policies developed and implemented by elected officials at the local level. 
Newman and Johnson further note that an individual problem, namely a lack of 
income or personal financial difficulty, may be attributed to immigrants. Then, once 
enough people go through similar personal difficulties, they begin to blame the immigrants 
who replace them at the warehouse or plant, inevitably creating a local societal problem. 
At this point, Newman and Johnson believe the idea gains momentum because it becomes 
a political problem at the local level.3 They maintain that the immigration backlash 
hypothesis applies when people do not like the ethnic change happening around them. 
Those people feel threatened by the change and hold local government officials 
accountable.4 When those same officials get elected, they deliver on their campaign 
promises by passing laws that restrict immigration, such as those passed in Arizona and 
 
1 Benjamin J. Newman and Joshua Johnson, “Ethnic Change, Concern over Immigration, and Approval 
of State Government,” State Politics & Policy Quarterly 12, no. 4 (2012): 415–37, https://www.jstor.org/
stable/24711095. 
2 Newman and Johnson.  
3 Newman and Johnson, 422. 
4 Newman and Johnson, 423. 
3 
Alabama at the end of the aughts. These states exemplify the immigration backlash 
hypothesis in practice. 
The process of changing the lens from an individual discomfort to a societal 
problem was first described by Brody and Sniderman in 1977 as “shifting the locus of 
concern.”5 As Newman and Johnson stress, oftentimes, this shift gives the original 
complainant more economic opportunity, making her or him happy and motivated to vote 
again for that individual, which keeps the politician in his or her seat and “strengthens” the 
economy.6 While studying the immigration backlash hypothesis, Newman and Johnson 
observed that in parts of California, Caucasians who lived in mostly Hispanic areas focused 
more on immigration than those whose areas were home to fewer Hispanic residents or had 
less Hispanic growth.7 In 2016, Grant Rissler documented similar results in Virginia.8 The 
study focused on the effects of local-level bureaucrats on integration. Rissler found that in 
larger cities, career bureaucrats, not politicians, were the ones who could move or stop 
policies within the approval process.9 This interesting nuance from Newman and Johnson’s 
immigration backlash approach as interpreted by Rissler’s theory insinuates that not  
only political appointees or politicians but also career workers have power in local-level 
policy decisions. 
Another interesting study, which examines the Salvadoran community in Los 
Angeles, looks into the role of race and ethnicity in integration and immigration at the local 
level. Although Kotin, Dyrness, and Irazábal’s study seems more “immigrant friendly” 
than others, it highlights the racial element of integration and introduces the idea of 
binationalism. Kotin, Dyrness, and Irazábal examine the policies and effects of two 
 
5 Newman and Johnson, 422. 
6 Newman and Johnson, 422–23. 
7 Newman and Johnson, 424. 
8 Newman and Johnson, “Ethnic Change”; Grant E. Rissler, “Varied Responsiveness to Immigrant 
Community Growth among Local Governments: Evidence from the Richmond, Virginia, Metropolitan 
Area,” State & Local Government Review 48, no. 1 (2016): 30–41. 
9 Rissler, “Varied Responsiveness to Immigrant Community Growth.” 
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different, largely Latin-American agencies on the local Salvadoran community.10 One 
agency was religious, the other a civic agency, and both agencies had contacted the local 
immigrant community and connected with new Salvadoran immigrants in Los Angeles.11 
Kotin, Dyrness, and Irazábal suggest that religion acts as a bridge for new immigrants from 
their old cultures and customs to their new country.12 Indeed, such old customs and 
traditions as religious parades to celebrate holidays held in a new venue, such as the streets 
of Los Angeles, allow these immigrants to create a binational identity, whereby they 
become familiar with their new homes while keeping some of their old culture, which 
arguably is the goal of integration.13 This article does a great job of examining the breadth 
of effects from population changes, not only on host societies but also on immigrants as 
individuals and groups.14 These pieces highlight their integration is not just an economic 
issue; there are personal and societal effects on everyone involved. While individuals  
may adopt a pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant stance for personal reasons, personal reasons 
turn into societal problems with ramifications for everyone at both an individual and 
societal level. 
In the most candid study encountered thus far, Ybarra, Sanchez, and Sanchez 
explore the effects of the great recession in the early 2000s on immigration policy. They 
found that the recession forced receiving countries to limit immigration flow and encourage 
immigrants to leave.15 Citing a 2005 survey of all 50 states, the authors observe that the 
greater the number of foreign-born residents and the fewer the jobs available, the greater 
the perceived job threat from immigrants. When jobs and economic growth are threatened, 
the divide forms across racial majority–minority lines. The authors hypothesize that 
 
10 Stephanie Kotin, Grace R. Dyrness, and Clara Irazábal, “Immigration and Integration: Religious and 
Political Activism for/with Immigrants in Los Angeles,” Progress in Development Studies 11, no. 4 (2011): 
263–84, https://doi.org/10.1177/146499341001100401. 
11 Kotin, Dyrness, and Irazábal. 
12 Kotin, Dyrness, and Irazábal. 
13 Kotin, Dyrness, and Irazábal. 
14 Kotin, Dyrness, and Irazábal. 
15 Vickie D. Ybarra, Lisa M. Sanchez, and Gabriel R. Sanchez, “Anti-Immigrant Anxieties in State 
Policy: The Great Recession and Punitive Immigration Policy in the American States, 2005–2012,” State 
Politics & Policy Quarterly 16, no. 3 (2016): 313–39, https://doi.org/10.1177/1532440015605815. 
5 
although economic issues may be the vehicle for immigration policy changes, the presence 
of racialized immigrant populations must first exist.16 Ybarra, Sanchez, and Sanchez 
conclude that racial or ethnic population variables have the greatest substantive impact on 
immigration policy changes.17 However, in areas with increasing populations of multiple 
ethnic groups, including Asian populations, immigration policy does not typically 
change.18 This article furthers the idea that there is more to integration than economic 
drivers.19 While economic gains and losses are easiest to identify and measure, other 
factors—such as education, housing, and instances of discrimination based on race, 
ethnicity, and religion—may determine whether integration policies are working. 
In conclusion, the literature addresses different reasons for more- or less-effective 
integration strategies across the United States. While several of the scholars acknowledge 
that the health of the economy is the most easily identifiable, measurable indicator of a 
community’s financial health, most of them address other factors as more influential when 
discussing effective integration of immigrants, namely race, ethnicity, and politics. The 
literature stresses that race, money, and politics all play a role in integration practices and 
policies. 
The literature describes how individuals may take a position on integration because 
they have been deprived of money, dislike a certain race, or perceive integration to be better 
or worse for their political positions. Once these positions begin to spread to other 
individuals, they become a community or societal problem, which is often manifest in the 
political process and by elected representatives. Those elected officials are then held 
accountable to fix the perceived societal problem, which at times includes integration 
policies. The literature does not adequately address how to combat this process from the 
local government perspective. While some of the case studies address non-governmental 
organizations or career bureaucrats’ approaches to addressing integration policies or 
programs, they do not address those of local leadership or elected officials. 
 
16 Ybarra, Sanchez, and Sanchez. 
17 Ybarra, Sanchez, and Sanchez. 
18 Ybarra, Sanchez, and Sanchez. 
19 Ybarra, Sanchez, and Sanchez. 
6 
C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis presents a comparative analysis of existing foreign (national level) and 
U.S. (local level) immigration integration policies to assess policy options for improving 
the promotion of immigrant integration into the United States. Specifically, this thesis 
examines national and local approaches through case studies of the Netherlands, Canada, 
Singapore, and Dayton, Ohio. These countries and localities have all taken different 
approaches and enacted different laws to encourage or discourage the integration of 
immigrants. These cases were chosen because each enacted policy at the local level to 
influence integration in that area and the surrounding areas. 
This thesis adopts the International Organization of Migration (IOM)’s definition 
of integration: “the process of mutual adaptation between the host society and the migrants 
themselves, both as individuals and as groups.”20 To measure how successful each of these 
countries and localities has been at integration, this thesis uses the Common Basic 
Principles for Immigrant Integration, adopted and published by the Council of Justice and 
Home Affairs of the European Union (EU) in November 2004.21 The principles are as 
follows: 
1. Integration is a dynamic, two-way process of mutual 
accommodation by all immigrants and residents of Member 
States. 
2. Integration implies respect for the basic value of the European 
Union. 
3. Employment is a key part of the integration process and is 
central to the participation of immigrants, to the contributions 
immigrants make to the host society, and to making such 
contributions visible. 
4. Basic knowledge of the host society’s language, history and 
institutions is indispensable to integration; enabling immigrants 
 
20 International Organization for Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion: Key Elements for 
Reaping the Benefits of Migration (Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration, 2017), 
1, https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/our_work/ODG/GCM/IOM-Thematic-Paper-Integration-and-
Social-Cohesion.pdf. 
21 Council of the European Union, “2618th Council Meeting” (Brussels: Council of the European 
Union, 2004), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/82745.pdf. 
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to acquire this basic knowledge is essential to successful 
integration. 
5. Efforts in education are critical to preparing immigrants, and 
particularly their descendants, to be more successful and more 
active participants in society. 
6. Access for immigrants to institutions, as well as to public and 
private goods and services, on a basis equal to national citizens 
and in a non-discriminatory way is a critical foundation for 
better integration. 
7. Frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State 
citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration. Shared 
forums, inter-cultural dialogue, education about immigrants and 
immigrant cultures, and stimulating living conditions in urban 
environments enhance the interactions between immigrants and 
Member State citizens. 
8. The practice of diverse cultures and religions is guaranteed 
under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be 
safeguarded, unless practices conflict with other inviolable 
European rights or with national law. 
9. The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and 
in the formulation of integration policies and measures, 
especially at the local level, supports their integration. 
10. Mainstreaming integration policies and measures in all relevant 
policy portfolios and levels of government and public services 
is an important consideration in public policy formation and 
implementation. 
11. Developing clear goals, indicators and evaluation mechanisms 
are necessary to adjust policy, evaluate progress on integration 
and to make the exchange of information more effective.22 
These 11 principles are the pillars by which immigrants and host countries may 
build a relationship and write integration policies. The principles serve as guideposts for 
communities that are working on integrating immigrants. This thesis analyzes how well 
each case study follows principles 3 through 12. Principle 1 is similar to the IOM’s 
definition of integration, which this thesis adopts as the model definition for integration, 
so it does not need to be considered. Principle 2 does not need to be considered as this 
 
22 Council of the European Union, 24. 
8 
thesis assumes the countries and localities have enacted policies and programs because 
they respect themselves, and not all are located in the EU. 
Principles 3 through 12 make clear that employment, education, and equal access 
to services are all important to integrating communities. Respect for the arriving 
immigrants’ culture as well as the host’s culture is also important, according to the 
guidelines. Moreover, according to the EU, communication and participation seem to be 
the keys to integration. The EU subscribes to the IOM’s definition and recommends 
constant communication between hosts and immigrants. It is through communication that 
adaptation happens, integration policies normalize, and policies are critiqued and 
re-evaluated. Rather than evaluate each case study using every principle, this thesis applied 
the three aforementioned categories, which represent groups of principles. Each case study 
received a score on a scale of 1 to 5 in the following areas. 
1. Employment, Education, and Equal Access to Services 
This category measures the employment rates, education rates, and policies in place 
to ensure immigrants have the same level of access as native-born citizens. This category 
analyzes not just numbers but how well the policies in place provide the same kinds of 
opportunities to both immigrants and native-born citizens and how successful a case study 
is at making integration policy mainstream policy. A high score in this category means, 
broadly, that immigrants are as educated and as employed and have the same access to 
services as native-born citizens in a particular case. This category includes principle 
numbers 3, 5, 6, and 10 of the original 11. A score of 1 constitutes low employment, 
meaning employment equals half or less that of native-born citizens; low education, 
meaning education opportunities equal half or less that of native-born citizens; and unequal 
access to services. A score of 2 constitutes employment and education at 60 percent that of 
native-born citizens. A score of 3 constitutes employment and education at 70 percent that 
of native-born citizens and approaches greater parity. A score of 4 constitutes 80 percent 
that of native-born citizens. A score of 5 is near equality. The percentages were determined 
by analyzing the applicable data and comparing the policies and programs from each of the 
case studies to assign a holistic score for the categories. 
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2. Respect for Cultures 
This category analyzes how well the policies in place provide for the practice of 
multiple cultures and religions. It also evaluates how well each case study prepares 
immigrants for life in their locality by providing the immigrants with the host’s history, 
traditions, and languages. A high score in this category means, broadly, that immigrants 
and the host both understand each other’s history, languages, and cultures and are 
respectful of each other’s cultural practices This category includes principle numbers 4 and 
8 of the original 11. A score of 1 constitutes no effort by the host country, a score of  
2 constitutes a marginal effort to accommodate culture and language, a score of 3 
constitutes programs to teach culture and language and an effort by the host country to 
reciprocate, a score of 4 represents a reciprocal accommodation, and a score of 5 represents 
a superior effort. 
3. Communication and Participation 
This category analyzes how well the policies in place facilitate interaction between 
immigrants and native-born citizens, in either personal or professional capacities. It also 
evaluates how well each case study measures its success, whether it be a vote or a diploma, 
in an ongoing process. A high score in this category means that the immigrants and native-
born citizens interact frequently. Further, it means that each stakeholder has clear 
expectations for itself and others and understands those expectations. Lastly, a case study 
that has a structured re-evaluation plan, which includes feedback, analysis, and a path to 
implementation of such feedback earns a high score. This category includes principle 
numbers 7, 9, and 11 of the original 11. A score of 1 constitutes little or no interaction, a 
score of 2 constitutes some interaction, a score of 3 constitutes greater interaction and 
formal programs to facilitate the relationship, a score of 4 approaches greater parity and 
informal communication, and a score of 5 reflects support for ongoing communication and 
a continued relationship. 
These scores measure how successful the case study is compared to the others given 
the available data. A score of 1 is least successful while a score of 5 is most successful. 
This study analyzed each case using these principles and several data points collected in 
10 
surveys, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 2018 
survey and report, to determine whether the locality has successfully integrated 
immigrants.23 The data include population growth, education level, unemployment level, 
average income, housing numbers, health conditions, participation in national elections, 
and instances of discrimination in each area.24 This study used primary sources—
government policies from Singapore, Canada, and the Netherlands, including policy 
documents, hearing transcripts, and surveys conducted by the governments—and 
secondary sources—including peer-reviewed articles, books, and media articles. 
Finally, using the findings of this comparative analysis, this thesis provides 
recommendations for policymakers to improve existing local policies on integration in the 
United States. A society never arrives at the end of the integration process because it 
continues as long as new people keep coming. Measuring integration proves quite difficult. 
This author combined the principles and survey results to create recommendations for local 
leaders. These recommendations act as reminders and guideposts for local leaders who are 
interested in applying the IOM’s definition and the EU’s principles of integration in their 
localities and who recognize the ongoing nature of integration and need for adaptation to 
achieve such integration. 
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The following four chapters are case studies of integration policies and programs 
that were developed and implemented at both a national and local level. Each case study 
begins with a history of immigration and integration policies. Next, the chapter presents 
data, from either local surveys or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s integration project, on immigrants’ education, housing, income, and 
employment and instances of discrimination toward them in the locality compared to 
natural-born citizens. Then, each case is analyzed using the IOM’s definition of integration 
 
23 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union, Settling in 2018: 
Indicators of Immigrant Integration (Brussels: OECD Publishing, 2018), https://doi.org/10.1787/
9789264307216-en. 
24 “Integration Scoreboard: Canada,” Compare Your Country, accessed May 26, 2020, https://www1.
compareyourcountry.org/indicators-of-immigrant-integration/en/0/all/default/all/CAN.  
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and the EU’s principles as guideposts to measure progress toward integration. Finally, each 
chapter concludes with a few takeaways on the effects of that locality’s policies and 
programs on the immigrant population. 
Chapter VI of this thesis compares and analyzes all four of the case studies to build 
recommendations for local leaders in the United States who are considering the 
development and implementation of integrations policies and programs. The concluding 
chapter also briefly describes the U.S. immigration system and explains how local leaders 
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II. THE NETHERLANDS 
The Netherlands’ approach to immigration and integration changed several times 
in a relatively short period. The retraction of the Dutch Kingdom and the needs of the 
post-World War II Dutch economy seem to be the catalysts for changes to the policies. The 
Dutch decided who they would let in to help rebuild their economy with strict guidelines 
and limited benefits. For example, the Moluccans were forced to live in dormitories, 
allowed to stay only as migrant workers or soldiers, and never really welcomed to stay 
permanently, until policy began to change to accommodate family reunification.25 As the 
Netherlands began expanding who was allowed into the country, it also began raising 
expectations once people arrived. As part of the naturalization process, the Netherlands 
created a mandatory integration curriculum, which was designed to teach new immigrants 
the Dutch language and way of life.26 If immigrants fail to complete this course 
successfully, they are fined.27 A time limit for completion of the curriculum after arrival 
has also been instituted.28 
The histories of the policies coupled with the data collected on natural-born and 
foreign-born Dutch citizens show that while the integration policies of the Netherlands 
address several of the EU’s principles, they fail to meet the definition of integration per the 
IOM because the immigrant in the Netherlands adapts much more to the country than the 
country to the immigrant. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Although immigration in the Netherlands has a long history, integration policy is 
only about 40 years old. Those 40 years have featured four major integration-related policy 
 
25 “History of Immigration in the Netherlands,” University College London, accessed May 8, 2020, 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/dutchstudies/an/SP_LINKS_UCL_POPUP/SPs_english/multicultureel_
gev_ENG/pages/geschiedenis_imm.html. 
26 “Naturalisation,” Immigration and Naturalisation Service, Dutch, accessed May 22, 2020, http://ind.
nl:80/en/dutch-citizenship/Pages/Naturalisation.aspx. 
27 Immigration and Naturalisation Service, Dutch. 
28 Immigration and Naturalisation Service, Dutch. 
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periods. From 1978 to the early 1990s, a “minorities” policy stayed in effect, providing 
permanent status to guest workers for the first time. From the 1990s until the turn of the 
millennium, an “integration” policy controlled the immigration and integration landscape 
by mandating Dutch language and Dutch history classes for new arrivals while passing 
laws facilitating immigrants’ ability to fill government jobs. Finally, after the start of the 
21st century, a “new style” took control, namely adding consequences, in the form of 
financial sanctions, for those who did not participate and pass the integration curriculum 
that had been developed in the 1990s.29 Each of these periods were formed and influenced 
by political and societal demands, such as the need for a temporary labor force to rebuild 
the economy and a cohesive national identity. 
1. Before 1978 
Before 1978, the Netherlands did not have a formal integration policy. After World 
War II, most of the country needed to be rebuilt or revitalized.30 The Dutch government 
responded by inviting laborers from several Mediterranean countries to rebuild the 
country.31 In the beginning, such workers had no restrictions, but as the number of 
immigrants grew, the government realized it needed to institute some checks on the 
system.32 During the initial rebuilding period, many workers came as visitors and secured 
jobs and work permits.33 To control the numbers, the Dutch government entered into 
recruiting agreements with different countries and required that work permits be granted 
prior to the workers’ arrival.34 By the early 1970s, immigration into the Netherlands 
depended largely on the Dutch economy; that decade’s oil crisis seriously crippled the 
 
29 Peter Scholten, “Frames and Frameshifts in Dutch Immigrant Integration Policy and Research,” in 
Framing Immigrant Integration: Dutch Research-Policy Dialogues in Comparative Perspective 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011), 68, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt46mt6p.7. 
30 University College London, “History of Immigration in the Netherlands.” 
31 University College London. 
32 Hans van Amersfoort and Rinus Penninx, “Regulating Migration in Europe: The Dutch Experience, 
1960–92,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 534 (1994): 133–46. 
33 Van Amersfoort and Penninx, 135. 
34 Van Amersfoort and Penninx, 135. 
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economy, resulting in significant job loss.35 As a result, labor migration came to a halt. 
Nevertheless, a law passed in 1974 allowed for family reunification of those who were still 
in the Netherlands working.36 Despite the lack of an official integration policy until 1978, 
immigration and integration focused on workers and their families. 
Another specific event that influenced immigration in the Netherlands before 1978 
was Suriname’s declaration of independence from the Dutch Kingdom in 1975. Ahead of 
the declaration, thousands of Surinamese began to immigrate to the Netherlands.37 This 
development was significant because prior to 1978, the Dutch took a differentialist 
approach to the people it allowed in, so immigrants were differentiated by their status as 
Dutch citizens.38 Once Suriname was no longer part of the Dutch Kingdom, the Surinamese 
lacked the preference to settle and remain in the Netherlands that they had enjoyed before 
Suriname’s independence. This change left thousands of Surinamese in limbo in the 
Netherlands about the status of their Dutch citizenship.39 
Furthermore, the government detailed four types of migrant: colonial, labor, family, 
and asylum. Although the controlling factor was country of origin, and its status as part of 
the Dutch Kingdom, the type of migrant categories influenced treatment and expectations 
of migrants. All migrants in the Netherlands at this time were encouraged to maintain 
strong ties with their homelands to ease re-integration there.40 Making large numbers of 
immigrant laborers live in barracks with people of the same nationality and teaching classes 
 
35 University College London, “History of Immigration in the Netherlands.” 
36 University College London. 
37 University College London. 
38 Scholten, “Frames and Frameshifts,” 71. Practically speaking, this approach meant that the 
Surinamese and Antilleans were considered part of the Dutch Kingdom, but Moluccans, Turks, and others 
were not. In the case of the Moluccans, the Dutch forced approximately 12,500 men, women, and children 
to leave their lands near Indonesia to fight for the Dutch in the war and then never held up their part of the 
bargain—to establish the Republic of Maluku Selatan in Indonesia. Not only were the Moluccans rejected 
as part of the Dutch Kingdom; they were held in dorms and not allowed to work at first. After the war, 
Moluccans were seen as soldiers and then as temporary workers who would stay only as long as the work 
demanded them to stay. Around 300,000 Moluccans arrived between the end of World War II and the 
mid-1960s. By contrast, the Surinamese and Antilleans were allowed to come and go as they pleased 
because they were considered part of the larger kingdom. 
39 University College London, “History of Immigration in the Netherlands.” 
40 Scholten, “Frames and Frameshifts,” 71. 
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in the native language constantly reminded migrants of their temporary status in the 
Netherlands and the expectation for them to return home. 
2. 1978 to Early 1990s: Minorities Policy 
By the late 1970s, the Dutch generally accepted that laborers and their families who 
had arrived over the previous decades would remain in the Netherlands permanently, so 
they needed a place in society, thus giving birth to the minorities policy.41 In 1978, the 
minorities policy gave permanent status to guest workers and colonial migrants.42 For the 
first time, they were considered immigrants and given the title of “permanent cultural or 
ethnic minorities.”43 After reinforcing the importance of family reunification, the 
government adopted a new narrative—that the Netherlands was a country of migrants who 
had a place in the Netherlands.44 
The government also branded immigrants as a “minority,” which implies greater 
importance, or at least larger in numbers, to the majority. The minorities period aimed to 
give minorities an equal position and full opportunity for development in the Netherlands.45 
The Dutch government tried to achieve this equal position by offering free language classes 
and vocational programs to immigrants who had lost their jobs during the economic 
downturn.46 The classes were not mandatory and made it easier for immigrants to 
communicate with native-born Dutch, while keeping their native culture. The previous four 
types of migrant changed to the following seven: Moluccans, Surinamese, Antilleans, 
foreign workers, gypsies, caravan dwellers, and refugees.47 Changing the labels of each 
group was significant because the new labels began to identify specific groups of people 
instead of the purpose for immigration. 
 
41 “Dutch Government and the Immigrants,” University College London, accessed May 8, 2020, 
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/dutchstudies/an/SP_LINKS_UCL_POPUP/SPs_english/multicultureel_gev_ENG/pa
ges/autochtonen.html. 
42 Scholten, “Frames and Frameshifts,” 72. 
43 University College London, “History of Immigration in the Netherlands.” 
44 University College London. 
45 Scholten, “Frames and Frameshifts,” 72. 
46 University College London, “Dutch Government and the Immigrants.” 
47 Scholten, “Frames and Frameshifts,” 72. 
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The minorities policy marked a significant shift of the status of immigrants in the 
Netherlands. Politically, the people of the Netherlands saw the minorities policy as a 
positive development.48 This policy expanded economic opportunities for all residents by 
changing the purpose of immigration in the country, which had primarily been to supply 
labor.49 The minorities policy also rejected the ideas of differentialism, which had meant 
people were treated differently based on their nationality; instead, assimilation 
simultaneously created one group—the minority—and recognized that group as different 
from Dutch natives.50 This period set the tone for the integration policies the Netherlands 
uses today. This period identified the groups considered the majority and those considered 
a minority. This distinction is important because the Dutch policies today want as many 
new immigrants—the minority—to become members of the majority—Dutch citizens—as 
quickly as possible via mandatory integration courses. 
3. 1990s–2000s: The Immigrant/Integration Policy 
The Dutch government began instituting the laws and policies that formed the 
current integration policy during this period. From the early 1990s until around the turn of 
the millennium, the Dutch government instituted an integration policy to help newly 
arriving immigrants integrate into Dutch society more quickly.51 The main takeaways of 
the integration period were that, in an effort to be more diverse, the Dutch government 
began hiring more minorities and re-examining its laws to eliminate those seen as unfair to 
minorities.52 The Dutch government achieved these goals through laws such as the 
Employment Equity Act, which established hiring protocols, educational trajectories, and 
expectations for new arrivals on a national scale.53 The law also required new immigrants 
to learn the Dutch language and basic information about Dutch history and society.54 The 
 
48 Scholten, 72. 
49 Scholten, 72. 
50 Scholten, 72. 
51 University College London, “Dutch Government and the Immigrants.” 
52 Scholten, “Frames and Frameshifts,” 74. 
53 Scholten, 74–75. 
54 Scholten, 76. 
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Dutch government began free language classes in every local area across the entire 
nation.55 In return, it removed any label from the person’s record based on nationality, 
ethnicity, or immigration status.56 The 1990s were a busy decade in the Netherlands for 
integration policy. The decade saw several laws passed and policies implemented aimed at 
helping new immigrants learn about Dutch society, which is consistent with the EU’s 
principles. Notably, the laws passed during the 1990s represented the first time the 
government’s actions aligned with the EU’s principles. 
Around the turn of the millennium, the Dutch government began forcing its 
integration policies on newly arriving immigrants. The federal legislature passed a new 
integration law called the Newcomers’ Integration Law.57 By making Dutch language and 
history classes mandatory, this law shifted the onus of integrating immigrants from the 
government to the individual immigrant.58 The law represented another significant shift in 
the direction of assimilation and national identity, as fueled by a perceived need for national 
unity. In observing the tragic terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, 
the Dutch government felt it could avoid a similar incident if everyone believed in one 
national identity.59 Dutch politicians wanted to know whether the people who were 
immigrating could embrace the national Dutch identity.60 The goal of this policy was to 
“close the distance between immigrants and the native Dutch.”61 An integration course 
focused on learning language, vocational training, and social orientation was mandatory 
for all immigrants who were in the country for less than a year.62 Failure to complete this 
course resulted in sanctions (usually financial) for the immigrant—though it bears 
mentioning that the EU does not expressly prohibit the mandating of integration courses.63 
 
55 University College London, “Dutch Government and the Immigrants.” 
56 Scholten, “Frames and Frameshifts,” 75. 
57 University College London, “Dutch Government and the Immigrants.” 
58 University College London. 
59 Scholten, “Frames and Frameshifts,” 77. 
60 Scholten, 77. 
61 Scholten, 77. 
62 University College London, “Dutch Government and the Immigrants.” 
63 University College London. 
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Nevertheless, no evidence suggests that the Dutch government during this time 
communicated with immigrants who were going through the programs or adapted to the 
needs of the immigrants. Indeed, the Netherlands began to stray from the principles and 
definition of integration during this era. 
The government continued to expand and strengthen its policies through the mid-
2000s. In January 2007, the Newcomers’ Integration Law became the Integration Law, 
which expanded the requirements for people who had lived in the Netherlands for a few 
years but had not completely integrated into Dutch society and become independent.64 Part 
of this law mandates an exam on the Dutch language and society that immigrants must pass 
before they can earn permanent status in the Netherlands—and penalizes those who fail to 
learn the Dutch language or complete the vocational and social trainings.65 This new body 
of laws forces assimilation with consequences, such as €250–€1,000 in fines, other 
penalties, or reductions of welfare benefits, for non-compliance.66 
To accomplish integration, the Netherlands set up a formal system for training and 
evaluation. Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs (Education Executive Agency, or DUO)—which 
is part of the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science—administers the Civic 
Integration Act for the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.67 DUO offers a number 
of courses to new immigrants, including the Dutch language, an orientation to the labor 
market, and Dutch social customs.68 Each of these courses prepares students to pass the 
civic integration exam. The Dutch government considers someone integrated when they 
pass the exams and have the National Integration Diploma.69 In short, the Dutch 
government provides resources in the form of classes to new immigrants with the intention 
 
64 University College London. 
65 University College London. 
66 “The Netherlands: Discrimination in the Name of Integration,” Human Rights Watch, May 13, 2008, 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2008/05/13/netherlands-discrimination-name-integration/migrants-rights-
under-integration. 
67 “Jaarbericht 2019,” Zakelijke Dienstverlening, accessed May 22, 2020, https://duo.foleon.com/duo-
publicaties/jaarbericht-2019/zakelijke-dienstverlening/. 
68 “U gaat inburgeren: Cursus kiezen,” Dienst Uitvoering Onderwijs, accessed May 22, 2020, 
https://www.inburgeren.nl/u-gaat-inburgeren/cursus-kiezen.jsp. 
69 Immigration and Naturalisation Service, Dutch, “Naturalisation.” 
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of teaching them what they need to pass the exam. After successful completion of the exam, 
the Dutch government considers an immigrant integrated. 
B. DATA ON INTEGRATION 
Determining whether the effects of these laws foster successful immigrant 
integration requires an analysis of the immigration and integration figures provided by the 
Dutch government and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD). Although tracking the number of National Integration Diplomas issued is 
straightforward, evaluating how those diploma-holders fare in Dutch society, compared to 
native-born Dutch, is useful. To assist in measuring the success of these integration efforts, 
this thesis uses the OECD’s 2018 integration report.70 The OECD compares the foreign-
born population to the native-born population in areas such as population percentage, 
employment rate, education levels, housing situation, health status, national identity, and 
instances of discrimination. Each of these measures helps evaluate how the Dutch approach 
is working compared to the approaches of other EU member states. 
The foreign-born population grew from about 10 percent to about 13 percent from 
2006 to 2017 in the Netherlands.71 Of that 13 percent, about 8 percent arrived in the last 
five years.72 On average, about 11.5 percent of any EU country’s population is foreign-
born.73 The employment rate for native-born Dutch people is 14 percent higher than that 
of foreign-born Dutch.74 Moreover, 30 percent of foreign-born and 12 percent of native-
born Dutch live in poverty. Regarding higher learning in the Netherlands, 36 percent of 
native-born and 28 percent of foreign-born citizens have received “tertiary” education, or 
post-secondary schooling.75 
 
70 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union, Settling in 2018. 
71 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union, 6. 
72 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union, 7. 
73 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union, 7. 
74 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union, 11. 
75 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union, 8. 
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Children of native parents score highest on standardized exams, followed those of 
mixed parents, then by those of foreign-born parents.76 Regarding housing conditions, 8 
percent of foreign-born and 2 percent of native-born Dutch live in overcrowded or 
substandard housing.77 Also, 62 percent of foreign-born and 75 percent of native-born 
citizens self-report good health.78 Furthermore, 75 percent of immigrants claim Dutch 
nationality.79 Regarding their treatment in the country, 19 percent of immigrants between 
the ages of 15 and 64 self-reported instances of discrimination against them based on race, 
ethnicity, or nationality.80 The portion of the population ages 15–34 comprises 16 percent 
native-born citizens with mixed or foreign parents and 10 percent foreign-born citizens.81 
Figure 1 compares foreign-born and native-born residents using several of OECD numbers, 
illustrating the distinct experiences of these two groups. The graph helps to illustrate that 
native-born Dutch are healthier, more educated, more likely to be employed, more likely 
to be living in reasonable housing, and more likely to be living above the poverty line than 
foreign-born citizens. 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of Foreign-Born Immigrants to 
Native-Born Citizens in the Netherlands82 
 
76 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union, 26. 
77 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union, 17. 
78 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union, 19. 
79 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union, 21. 
80 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union, 23. 
81 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union, 25. 
82 Adapted from Compare Your Country, “Integration Scoreboard: Canada.” 
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These numbers suggest that the Netherlands is struggling with several of the EU’s 
principles. As the EU maintains, employment is key, education is critical, and immigrants 
must have the same access to institutions and public and private goods as member state 
citizens.83 In conclusion, despite the policies described in this chapter and 75 percent of 
immigrants reporting that the Netherlands has been successful in teaching immigrants basic 
knowledge of the host society’s language, history, and institutions—as outlined in the EU’s 
third principle—these numbers suggest a serious separation between the employment, 
education, and access immigrants have compared to native-born citizens. 
Brian Burgoon details three major gaps in European integration and redistribution 
support in a piece for World Politics.84 The gaps are in unemployment rates, dependency 
on social benefits, and attitudes toward gender relations, religion, political views, and 
social standards.85 Using a dataset from 2001–2010, Burgoon discovered that the three 
gaps in the Netherlands were consistent with those found in the rest of Europe.86 By 
comparison, however, in other European countries, the gap in attitudes toward gender, 
religion, politics, and social standards was much higher than the unemployment and 
dependency on social benefit gaps whereas in the Netherlands, all three gaps were equally 
high.87 The unemployment gap between native-born and foreign-born Dutch is among the 
highest in Europe, according to Burgoon.88 These gaps appeared during the first 10 years 
of the new policy period, and the figures from the OECD represent the second decade of 
the new policy era. In sum, whether any of the Dutch policies achieved their goals and 
whether the country fostered integration are still up for debate. 
 
83 Council of the European Union, “2618th Council Meeting.” 
84 Brian Burgoon, “Immigration, Integration, and Support for Redistribution in Europe,” World Politics 
66, no. 3 (2014): 365–405. 
85 Burgoon, 372. 
86 Burgoon, 381. 
87 Burgoon, 381. 
88 Burgoon, 381. 
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C. ANALYSIS 
Given the information presented in this chapter, the Netherlands received the 
following scores in each of the evaluation areas described in the research design: 
1. Employment, education, and equal access to services: 3 
2. Respect for cultures: 3 
3. Communication and participation: 2 
In using the first set of criteria—employment, education, and equal access to 
services—the Netherlands earns 3 out of 5 points. Foreign-born people are less likely to be 
employed in the Netherlands, and this is a concern given that the EU’s principles state that 
employment is key.89 Immigrants are less likely to be highly educated and less likely to 
score highly on standardized tests. This is a concern because the EU’s principles also state 
that education is critical.90 Immigrants in the Netherlands are also more likely to live in 
poverty, less likely to be considered healthy, more likely to live in substandard conditions, 
and more likely to be discriminated against compared to native-born Dutch people. These 
are all concerns because the EU’s principles recommend equal access to institutions and 
goods, both public and private, for immigrants and natural-born citizens.91 Because 
immigrants were not considered equal in any of the aforementioned categories, the 
Netherlands’ case study earns a 3 out of 5 possible points in employment, education, and 
equal access to services. This score could improve to be on par with the other case studies 
if the OECD’s numbers reflected less of a gap between foreign-born and native-born 
residents in each category. For all of the aforementioned reasons, the Netherlands is not a 
good model to follow to achieve equal employment, education, and access to services. 
In applying the second set of criteria—respect for cultures—the Netherlands fared 
a bit better and earns 3 out of 5 points. Seventy-five percent of immigrants claim the Dutch 
 
89 Council of the European Union, “2618th Council Meeting.”  
90 Council of the European Union. 
91 Council of the European Union. 
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national identity as their own.92 This figure suggests that the mandatory passing of 
integration exams to remain in country and the high percentage of new immigrants who 
are adopting the national Dutch identity means the Netherlands is succeeding in 
implementing some of the EU’s principles, such as ensuring basic knowledge of the host 
society’s language, history, and institutions and developing clear goals and indicators of 
progress. The focus is on teaching newcomers “the Dutch way” once they arrive in the 
Netherlands. The country has put more focus on newcomers’ learning the ways of the host 
country and less emphasis on mutual adaptation of both the host society and the immigrants 
as individuals and a collective. Because immigrants in the Netherlands have been forced 
to learn Dutch history, traditions, and language, the country should receive high marks in 
the respect for cultures category; however, a deduction must be made because there was 
no evidence that the Netherlands has taken steps to preserve the home culture of the 
arriving immigrants. The Netherlands earns 3 out of 5 possible points in respect for 
cultures. In conclusion, the Netherlands achieves respect for culture—if one considers only 
Dutch culture. If there is to be mutual recognition or acceptance of cultures, the Netherlands 
is not a good model. 
Finally, in analyzing the communication and participation criteria, the Netherlands 
has not been successful, earns only 2 out of 5 points. Although the government and 
immigrants seem to interact, that interaction is mandatory. The Netherlands could receive 
a better score if it developed a way to foster that interaction without forcing it. The 
Netherlands scored lower than other countries in this set of criteria because it has a very 
clear objective for integration, and that is the successful completion of an exam. While the 
expectations are clear—and the Dutch deserve credit for that—the re-evaluation plan or 
process seems non-existent. The Netherlands has a strict curriculum with a clear goal that, 
once achieved, means integration is over. Given this approach, the Netherlands earns 2 out 
of 5 points in communication and participation. In conclusion, while the Netherlands has 
clear expectations, it is not a model for successfully achieving communication and 
participation. 
 
92 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and European Union, Settling in 2018. 
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Given the policy focus and accompanying data, the Netherlands is not following a 
significant number of the EU’s guidelines and is failing to integrate immigrants effectively 
per the IOM’s definition. It may be helpful to compare the Dutch approach to the rest of 
the EU. Figure 2 evaluates the Netherlands’ foreign-born numbers against the rest of the 
EU’s, showing that the Netherlands is about even with the greater EU. It would seem the 
greater EU is struggling to integrate immigrants successfully compared to some other 
countries, including Canada, whose case study is presented in the next chapter. 
 
Figure 2. Netherlands’ Foreign-Born Outcomes Compared to 
the Rest of the European Union93 
D. CONCLUSION 
Integration policy in the Netherlands underwent several significant changes in 
about 40 years. From demanding migrants keep strong ties to their home countries to 
requiring assimilation classes, and from forcing people to live with people of the same 
nationality to considering everyone a minority and letting the labor demand dictate 
immigrants’ entrance, the Dutch have tried numerous methods to address immigrant 
integration into their country.94 Each of these changes were building blocks to the system 
the Dutch have in place today. That system uses an exam to determine whether someone 
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is Dutch, and once an immigrant passes or fails the exam, the Dutch government is done 
with integration. The Dutch have developed a system that exposes new immigrants to the 
Dutch language, traditions, history, and institutions, not to mention creates a clear 
benchmark for complete integration. 
An evaluation of the Dutch system using the IOM’s definition and the EU’s 
principles shows that the Netherlands is focused on making new immigrants adapt to the 
government’s expectations of what it means to be Dutch. The government has centered its 
approach to integration on the following EU principle: “The immigrant needs basic 
knowledge of the host society’s language, history and institutions.”95 While no one 
principle is more important than the others, the failure to adopt more than one makes it 
clear that mutual adaptation is not happening in the Netherlands, and that is when 
integration efforts fail. 
Another issue with the Netherlands’ approach is that it believes integration has 
ended upon successful completion of an exam. This thesis posits and the IOM’s definition 
concurs that integration requires a constant effort toward mutual adaptation. The disparate 
numbers in the OECD’s data could be explained by the Dutch government’s lack of 
involvement once the exam is passed. There is no way to prove direct causation, but other 
case studies, with governments who remain involved longer, show less disparate numbers. 
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III. CANADA 
This chapter discusses Canada’s approach to integration and analyzes how it fares 
when evaluated against the EU’s principles and the IOM’s definition of integration. This 
chapter examines a series of bilateral agreements between the federal government and the 
Canadian provinces, national and local policies, and laws applied over the past 50 years 
that have allowed Canada to implement its current immigration and integration systems.96 
Canada’s current systems enable the provincial and federal governments to balance their 
respective economic and social needs by accepting immigrants into Canada. The country 
resettles immigrants into provinces that are the best fit for both the locality and the 
immigrant, which is evidence of successful integration according to the IOM.97 
This chapter starts with the historical background of immigration in Canada, 
examines how the structure of the Canadian government and its laws have dictated its 
approach to immigration and integration, and discusses how the government divides 
responsibilities and roles for immigration and integration. The chapter then analyzes these 
provincial agreements along with survey data from the OECD in 2018, which compares 
native-born and foreign-born individual’s situations regarding housing, education, safety, 
medical care, income level, and social acceptance. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Canada’s immigration philosophy has shifted through its history—from a 
prohibitionist approach that discriminated against certain ethnicities to a more welcoming 
attitude toward immigrants. Historically, Canada has presented itself as a difficult, if not 
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impossible, place to immigrate.98 Several exclusionary laws and policies were passed from 
the early 1800s until the late 1900s, mostly based on race or ethnicity.99 Two examples of 
these exclusionary laws and policies were the Gentlemen’s Agreement of 1908, in which 
the Canadian and Japanese prime ministers agreed to limit Japanese immigration to Canada 
to 400 people a year because of anti-Japanese sentiments in Canada as a result of an earlier 
influx of Japanese immigrants.100 The series of Chinese Immigration Acts instituted from 
the late 1800s until the mid-1900s provide another example.101 These laws began by 
charging Chinese immigrants fees to immigrate and then barred Chinese immigration 
altogether with the exception of diplomats.102 These laws highlight that the Canadian 
government, until about 60 years ago, was not interested in integrating certain populations 
and believed in discrimination based on nationality, which is against the EU’s principles 
of integration. 
Changes to immigration laws restricted immigration by skill level, rather than 
ethnicity or nationality. In 1962, new regulations removed the overt discrimination in 
Canada’s immigration laws and made skill the primary factor in considering who to allow 
into Canada.103 To make this regulation as objective as possible, in 1967, the Canadians 
instituted a points-based system for immigrants.104 Immigrants received points for 
education, occupation, employment prospects, English and French proficiency, personal 
character, and age.105 With a maximum of 100 points, an individual needed at least 50 to 
be accepted.106 For example, a prospective immigrant would receive 10 points if he or she 
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fell between the ages of 18 and 35 at the time of application, but lost a point for each year 
over 35.107 Although the points-based system became the means for immigrating into 
Canada, it did not address what happened to immigrants once they were inside its borders. 
Canada’s immigration further shifted again by formally adopting a pro-immigrant 
stance. In this context, in 1971, then–Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced that 
multiculturalism would be the official policy of Canada.108 The adoption of a multicultural 
policy meant that Canada would preserve the cultural freedom of the individual immigrants 
and recognize the contributions of those individuals and the diverse ethnic groups they 
represented in Canadian society.109 To take this policy one step further, in 1982, 
multiculturalism became part of the Canadian Constitution.110 For example, Section 27 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms states, “This Charter shall be interpreted in 
a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of 
Canadians.”111 The shift in 1971 was the first time the Canadian government had aligned 
itself with the EU’s principles and the IOM’s definition, in that it acknowledged diverse 
cultural practices would be allowed, as well as encouraged and protected. 
Canada declared multiculturalism not only a goal but also an institutional policy. 
Two more sweeping immigration laws passed in 1976 and 1988 helped lay the foundation 
for this multiculturalism law.112 The Immigration Act of 1976 forced the federal 
government to consult with other levels of government in immigration planning and 
management.113 The Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988 expanded the 1976 Act by 
protecting the cultural heritage of all Canadians and implementing multicultural programs 
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within institutions and organizations.114 This was the first national multicultural law in any 
country.115 These laws have created equal access for immigrants and made integration 
policy part of normal policy, which are two of the EU’s principles. 
The Immigration Act of 1976 laid the groundwork for the structure Canada uses 
today. The 1976 Act forced the federal government and the local or provincial government 
to work together to determine the best way to accomplish the goal of becoming 
multicultural. To facilitate the shared jurisdictional approach of immigration between the 
provincial and national governments, each province, except Quebec, signed a provincial 
agreement with the Canadian government.116 These agreements are significant because 
they introduced another stakeholder into the integration process: the provincial 
government. Including another stakeholder means that another party has to adapt for 
immigrants to integrate effectively. 
Finally, in 2002, the Canadian government passed the Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Act (IRPA), which made the federal government responsible for reuniting 
families, determining refugee claims within Canada, defining immigration categories, 
setting national immigration levels, and establishing admission requirements.117 
Furthermore, according to Laurence Brosseau of the Canadian Parliamentary Information 
and Research Service, 
Implementing the IRPA is the responsibility of the Minister of Immigration, 
Refugees and Citizenship and the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness. By default, the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and 
Citizenship is responsible for administering the IRPA where no other 
administrator is identified.118 
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This history is important because it provides a possible roadmap for local and federal 
policymakers to institute a change in their integration policy by passing legislation. It also 
explains the evolution of the current model and the federal–provincial relationship over 
immigration, which the next section discusses. 
B. FRAMEWORK FOR INTEGRATION 
Immigration is a shared burden between the national and provincial 
governments.119 The provincial governments’ responsibilities vary based on individual 
agreements the provinces have with the federal government.120 For example, New 
Brunswick agreed to accept a portion of special needs and especially vulnerable refugees 
in return for advanced notice of their arrival and proportional financial support for those 
populations, while other agreements make no mention of these populations.121 This 
example is important for the local policymaker as it provides a strategy that can be used 
when negotiating agreements with state or federal legislatures or funding bodies. 
These agreements vary in scope, and the federal government negotiates them 
separately with each province.122 One constant in all of these agreements is the Provincial 
Nominee Program (PNP), which authorizes provinces to develop and maintain their own 
immigration plans to address specific needs, while the federal government still determines 
the admissibility of the individuals.123 Quebec does not have a PNP agreement in place, 
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but it negotiated an agreement with the Canadian government that gave the province full 
control over selection of the immigrants’ economic class.124 
To be considered for the PNP, workers must 
• have the skills, education and work experience to contribute to the 
economy of a specific province or territory 
• want to live in that province, and 
• want to become permanent residents of Canada.125 
The PNP application process includes medical screenings and police checks, in addition to 
any eligibility requirements from the individual provinces to which the immigrants 
apply.126 The provinces use the PNP as a means to address their changing needs, largely 
workforce needs, on an annual basis. The number of permanent residents as a result of the 
PNP rose from 46,179 in 2016 to 62,427 in 2018.127 For context, Canada admitted 321,035 
permanent residents in 2018. This number represents the apex of permanent residents 
admitted to Canada since 1913.128 
The PNP provides a great deal of autonomy to each province. Through its 
agreements with the federal government, 
each province and territory establish its own “streams” (immigration 
programs that target certain groups) and requirements. For example, in a 
program stream, provinces and territories may target: 
• students 
• businesspeople 
• skilled workers 
• semi-skilled workers129 
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To expand this type of program, in 2017, the Canadian government began the 
Atlantic Immigration Pilot Program (AIPP) to address areas in which labor numbers were 
down.130 This program stipulated who would be responsible for immigrants after arrival 
and what they would do to help them be successful in their new homes, challenging 
employers to take on “the responsibility to connect their new worker(s) with the settlement 
services they need to integrate and thrive in their new homes, such as language training.”131 
Employers also take on responsibility for partnering with local settlement support services 
to guarantee newcomers and their families have things like housing and transportation.132 
So far, over 1,700 employers have participated in the pilot and offered 3,729 jobs to 
immigrants.133 In 2019, the federal government decided to extend the three-year pilot for 
another two years to give Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) time to 
assess the effects the pilot has had on the labor market in the affected areas.134 These types 
of programs are examples of attempts to follow the EU’s principles through employment 
and constant communication between community stakeholders and immigrants.135 Having 
these programs instituted as pilots and subject to re-evaluation guarantees communication 
among the government and stakeholders about the effectiveness of the program, which is 
consistent with the EU’s principle of re-evaluation, and exemplifies two-way 
communication, which is essential to integration. 
In addition to stimulating the labor market in certain provinces, the AIPP also 
represents the spirit of Canada’s general approach of accepting immigrants in every 
province. Canada considers itself one of the most welcoming countries for new 
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immigrants.136 Canada offers “a ‘whole of society’ approach that connects Canadians and 
newcomers, and helps them reach their economic and social potential.”137 Agreements 
between the federal government and individuals from the local, territorial, and provincial 
level serve as the mechanisms to provide services for new immigrants.138 Furthermore, as 
IRCC explains, “All permanent residents and protected persons are eligible for a range of 
federally funded settlement services up to the time they become citizens.”139 The Canadian 
government allocates funds to provide services in six areas: needs assessments and 
referrals, information and orientation, language assessments, language training, 
employment-related services and community connections, and support services such as 
translation to facilitate access to IRCC-funded settlement services.140 These types of 
programs ensure equal access for immigrants, consistent communication with 
stakeholders, and employment options so that immigrants can learn the culture, language, 
and traditions of their new host country. These types of programs are following the 
guideposts set out by the EU’s principles. 
The Canadian government’s website helps immigrants find local providers for 
specific needs or enlist the help of professionals for such things as language assessments, 
language class enrollment, forms and applications, home searches, school registration for 
children, and general community services.141 Although each province can offer additional 
services, the federal government makes these services available to all permanent residents. 
To ensure the PNP and immigration agreements benefit everyone, the provincial and 
federal governments have annual meetings to develop vision and action plans for the next 
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year.142 This is important because it gives the immigrant an opportunity to seek help if it is 
needed. Learning how to maneuver through these administrative tasks is part of adapting 
to the Canadian way of life. Moreover, the government’s providing people to assist 
immigrants with this process is evidence of mutual adaptation. 
In sum, Canada and its people understand that welcoming new immigrants to their 
lands is an important job, and the responsibility belongs to everyone. Canada has created a 
system—through a series of bilateral agreements between individuals and government at 
all levels—that assists new Canadians in adjusting to life in Canada. In return, Canada 
receives people who are able to contribute to the workforce sooner and feel welcome in 
Canada. The hope is that this system is mutually beneficial and makes both the country and 
the individual better. 
C. DATA ON INTEGRATION 
Analyzing whether Canada is effectively integrating immigrants per the EU’s 
principles requires not only a review of the agreements and policies in place but also an 
inspection of the data collected to measure those policies. In 2018, the OECD compared 
the foreign-born population to the native-born population in areas such as population 
percentage, employment rate, education levels, housing situation, health status, national 
identity, and instances of discrimination.143 Each of these statistics measures how well 
Canadians are “preserv[ing] the cultural freedom of individuals and provid[ing] 
recognition of the cultural contributions of diverse ethnic groups to Canadian society.”144 
This type of measurement indicates a “dynamic two way process of mutual 
accommodation,” or the first basic principle of the EU.145 In other words, these data along 
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with the policies in place help determine whether Canada has been effective at integrating 
immigrants. 
The foreign-born population grew from about 18 percent to about 21 percent from 
2006 to 2017 in Canada.146 Of that 21 percent, approximately 14 percent arrived in the last 
five years.147 The foreign-born average in EU countries is about 11.5 percent.148 Figure 3 
uses some of the same OECD data points to help illustrate that native-born and 
foreign-born Canadians are almost equally healthy, equally likely to be employed, equally 
likely to be living in reasonable housing, and equally likely to be living above the poverty 
line. Also, foreign-born citizens are more likely to be highly educated than native-born 
citizens. Moreover, native-born children with foreign-born parents score highest on 
standardized exams, followed by foreign-born children with foreign-born parents, and then 
native-born children with native-born parents.149 
 
Figure 3. Comparing Outcomes of Foreign-Born to Native-Born Canadians150 
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This figure indicates that immigrants in Canada, Canadian citizens, and the 
governments in Canada follow the education and employment principles of the EU. Ninety 
percent of immigrants claim Canadian nationality, which is a good indicator of integration, 
one of the EU’s principles.151 Seventy-eight percent of foreign-born Canadians reported 
voting in the most recent parliamentary election, which indicates immigrants in Canada are 
becoming involved in the democratic process, also an EU principle.152 Nevertheless, 13 
percent of immigrants between the ages of 15 and 64 self-reported instances of 
discrimination against them based on race, ethnicity, or nationality.153 This number 
indicates that the principle of equal access to institutions and private and public goods 
without discrimination needs to be examined.154 
The federal government’s annual immigration report also tracks all of the 
integration programs and surveys new Canadians about their experiences in entering 
Canadian society. The results of the 2018 survey indicate that 84 percent of participants 
have employment, which is significant given the importance of employment per the EU’s 
principles.155 Furthermore, 92 percent reported having a very strong or somewhat strong 
sense of belonging to Canada.156 This finding is further supported by the fact that only 1 
percent of people who arrive in Canada as immigrants decide to continue their journey to 
the United States.157 The annual immigration report shows that 93 percent of participants 
at least somewhat agree that they feel welcome in their local communities.158 Moreover, 
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according to A. E. Challinor in a 2011 piece for the Migration Policy Institute, “The vast 
majority of immigrants choose to become Canadian citizens after the three-year waiting 
period for naturalization eligibility has elapsed.”159 Challinor cites the example of 85.1 
percent of eligible immigrants naturalizing in 2006, a significant increase from previous 
years.160 In sum, Canada has focused on admitting educated and employable applicants, 
which has helped ease some of the difficulties of finding jobs or educational programs. 
Canada did not have to address education and employment immediately because of its 
selection process. Although local leaders may not choose who is admitted to their localities, 
they may recruit individuals with certain qualifications to bolster the labor market and, in 
turn, the economy. 
To summarize, 20 percent of the population ages 15–34 are either foreign-born or 
have at least one parent who is foreign-born. Foreign-born Canadians are slightly less likely 
to be employed than native-born Canadians (72 to 74 percent), more likely to be highly 
educated (60 to 45 percent), more likely to have children who score highly on standardized 
tests, more likely to live in poverty (27 to 18 percent), and equally likely to be considered 
healthy (89 percent), which is relevant considering the equal access principle. Immigrants 
are slightly more likely to live in substandard conditions (2 to 1 percent) and more likely 
to be discriminated against compared to native-born Canadian people. Finally, 90 percent 
of immigrants claim the Canadian national identity as their own.161 
D. ANALYSIS 
Based on the previous discussion, Canada received the following scores in each of 
the evaluation areas described in the research design: 
1. Employment, education, and equal access to services: 4 
2. Respect for cultures: 4 
3. Communication and participation: 4 
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In using the first set of criteria—employment, education, and equal access to 
services—it is clear that because of Canada’s bilateral agreements and pilots, there is a 
minimal difference between immigrant and native-born numbers in employment, health, 
housing, and social treatment, which earns Canada 4 out of 5 points. This minimal 
difference shows that immigrants, Canadian citizens, and the Canadian federal and local 
governments are selecting immigrants who may be more educated and fit the hiring needs 
of Canadian companies. In short, Canada is using its tools to strive seriously to follow as 
many of the EU’s principles as possible. 
One interesting figure is the much higher levels of tertiary education received by 
foreign-born Canadians than native-born Canadians. Of the represented populations, 25 
percent more foreign-born Canadians have achieved at least a bachelor’s degree level of 
education than native-born Canadians. This finding is intriguing because, depending on the 
age of the person when he or she immigrated, it may reflect an integration program the 
government put in place over 20 years ago, the PNP. According to the Canada’s 2019 
Annual Report, having the PNP in place has “resulted in a more balanced geographic 
distribution of permanent labor migrants across the country over the past two decades.”162 
Specifically, the higher level of education achieved by foreign-born Canadians may be 
credited to the PNP because, through its process, provinces can decide whether they want 
applicants to have a certain level of education before being admitted.163 It may also speak 
to the quality of the education system in Canada as a whole. Although Canada does not 
group students by immigration status, when the school system studied differences in test 
scores between students who speak English or French and those who do not, it found no 
significant gap in scores.164 
Whether it is accepting higher numbers of more highly educated immigrants or 
doing a better job of teaching immigrant children, the education levels of foreign-born 
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Canadians are much higher than those of native-born Canadians. As immigrants are either 
equal or close to equal in all of the aforementioned categories, the Canada case study earns 
4 out of 5 possible points in employment, education, and equal access to services. Canada 
could only earn a 5 once the numbers reflect that foreign-born and native-born Canadians 
are equal in every metric. In conclusion, Canada is doing an excellent job at analyzing its 
access to education, employment, and services to ensure equality between native-born and 
foreign-born Canadians and would be an excellent model to achieve equality. 
In analyzing the second set of criteria—respect for cultures—the Canada case also 
earns high marks: 4 out of 5. Notably, 90 percent of immigrants claim the Canadian 
national identity as their own.165 The directive from the highest levels of Canadian 
government that all cultures are to be respected sends a very clear message to immigrants 
and native-born Canadians that everyone’s culture is to be treated equally. Canada’s 
instances of discrimination are also among the lowest in the EU.166 Given the messaging 
on cultural respect from Canadian leadership, the high numbers in national identity, and 
low numbers in discrimination cases, Canada earns 4 out of 5 points in respect for cultures. 
Although Canada is making the right policy decision and messaging clearly, as long as 
there are instances of discrimination based on nationality, race, or ethnicity, it cannot earn 
5 out of 5 points. In conclusion, Canada’s leadership’s clear messaging and low figures in 
discrimination prove that it is a great model to follow to achieve respect for cultures. 
Finally, in analyzing the communication and participation criteria, the Canada case 
study showed it was successful, earning 4 out of 5 possible points. The Canadian 
government has facilitated communication between multiple stakeholders through its pilot 
programs. For example, the federal government leverages the local government, 
corporations, non-governmental organizations, and individual immigrants to work together 
to accomplish their mutual and individual goals. Immigrants are also beginning to take part 
in the democratic process, which is an indicator of Canada’s effectiveness in this criterion. 
Canada’s expectations are clear—it wants more Canadians—which earns the country high 
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marks. The re-evaluation plan or process is also important and has been highlighted. 
Canada re-evaluates each of its pilots regularly and gathers feedback constantly. Given this 
approach, Canada earns 4 out of 5 points in communication and participation. To earn 5 
out of 5 in this category, Canada would have to show how the feedback has changed the 
pilot programs—this may well come with time. In conclusion, Canada’s constant gathering 
of feedback and clear goals make it an exceptional case study to model to achieve effective 
communication and participation. 
In evaluating Canada’s foreign-born numbers against the EU’s, Canada ranked 
higher in employment rates, better in poverty rates, better in substandard housing, better in 
self-reported health rates, far ahead in highly educated immigrants, and near the top in 
accepting the host country’s national identity, at a rate of 90 percent compared to 60 percent 
for the EU.167 Figure 5 illustrates these data points. 
 
Figure 4. Foreign-Born Populations in Canada versus the European Union168 
These figures indicate the Canadian approach is producing above-average results 
compared to most of the EU, most notably because the EU created the standards. One more 
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figure helps to compare the case studies and the EU based on the principles of effective 
integration (see Figure 4).169 
 
Figure 5. Discrimination and National Identity in 
the EU Case Studies170 
This bar chart illustrates that Canada has the fewest reports of discrimination and 
the highest percentage of immigrants assuming the host nation’s identity. Although the 
Netherlands has better national identity numbers than the rest of the EU, its foreign-born 
citizens experience more discrimination. Although this thesis cannot establish a causal link 
between these numbers and a country’s integration policies, it does find the country that 
follows more of the principles and continues to integrate immigrants—beyond an exam 
required for naturalization—discriminates less and creates more citizens who identify as 
host country citizens. In sum, a comparison of data from Canada with data from the 
Netherlands and the rest of the EU indicates that Canada is effectively implementing 
several of the EU’s principles and effectively integrating immigrants. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Canada has come a long way in the last 150 years or so regarding its immigration 
and integration policies and systems. Recently, the federal government engaged local 
governments to establish a system that would be mutually beneficial while also sharing the 
responsibilities. This engagement of another stakeholder, the local governments, is a 
distinction from the Netherlands’ case. This distinction is important because it has helped 
increase the number of people involved in integration. Each stakeholder has some 
responsibility and something to gain from integrating immigrants into Canada, and each 
party has been willing to adapt. Through programs like the PNP and AIPP, the governments 
are ensuring that immigrant needs are met, while also guaranteeing that those admitted to 
Canada are supported once they arrive to be as productive as possible as quickly as 
possible. Although the data are not conclusive, the effectiveness of the AIPP over time 
could be a strong indicator of effectiveness and a topic for another research project when 
the program matures. 
The Canadian government’s continuing effort to communicate with its provincial 
partners, corporations, and immigrants has created a system whereby multiple parties 
continue to adapt to make each other’s situation better. The Canadian approach effectively 
follows the majority of the EU’s principles and the IOM’s definition of integration. 
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IV. SINGAPORE 
Singapore’s immigration process is based on a “multicultural meritocracy.”171 This 
city-state is an interesting case study because it adopted the IOM’s definition of integration 
as did this thesis.172 Additionally, Singapore balances the efficiency of government and the 
practical needs of a new state with an aging population—by welcoming, for example, 
temporary workers as construction laborers and caregivers—with cultural respect and 
governmental changes to accommodate people of different cultural backgrounds and 
socioeconomic means. Singapore has created a dynamic two-way process of mutual 
accommodation to become a wealthy state with a competitive economy in a short period.173 
In sum, the national immigration strategy has followed its success and continues to follow 
several of the EU’s principles, even though Singapore is not a member of the EU. This 
chapter asks how well Singapore has followed the IOM’s definition of integration. 
This chapter first analyzes Singapore’s immigration history and integration 
program structure to determine whether its changes in law and policy adhere to the IOM’s 
definition and the EU’s principles. This chapter focuses on applicants for Singaporean 
citizenship and how they fit into Singapore’s nation-building model. It analyzes the 
programs available to new citizens, or citizenship applicants who are waiting to naturalize, 
to determine what, if any, obstacles to integration exist for new Singaporeans. The history 
of the changes in immigration laws and policies provides context for how Singapore 
learned from its past and adopted the policies in place today. 
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Currently, migrants who wish to live and work in Singapore have six passes or 
paths to residency.174 These six passes address two tiers of workers.175 Lesser-skilled or 
unskilled workers may apply for the S Pass, Work Permit, or Foreign Domestic Workers 
Pass.176 For highly skilled workers, the Employment Pass, Personalized Employment Pass, 
and the EntrePass are available. Despite a lack of conclusive data to this point, selecting 
highly skilled workers before entry to stimulate the economy may already prioritize 
Singaporean employment.177 Lesser-skilled workers do not receive as many benefits—
such as healthcare, the ability to purchase land, and grants from the government—as highly 
skilled workers, who may receive all of those benefits to incentivize them to stay in 
Singapore.178 Although Singapore uses temporary migration, whether a matter of months 
or years depending on renewals, to build its country and economy, this analysis focuses on 
what happens once an individual receives approval to become a naturalized citizen. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Singapore, a former British colony, had restrictive immigration policies for years 
before becoming independent in 1965, in response to a swelling number of migrants from 
surrounding countries and the potential for overpopulation.179 At the time of its 
independence, Singapore allowed immigrants only from West Malaysia, as it was known 
then.180 The fledgling country had a high unemployment rate and was quickly becoming 
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overcrowded.181 In response to this economic challenge, the new government of Singapore 
began to restrict immigration and developed a family planning policy to limit population 
growth.182 This approach is contrary to all of the EU’s principles and the IOM’s definition 
of integration; it also did not work. 
These limitations did not last long.183 In 1965, Singapore desired more manpower 
to build the infrastructure it needed to survive and grow; thus, the temporary work permit 
was born.184 These permits allowed Malaysians to come to Singapore temporarily to help 
build the country.185 From these first permits, Singapore built its independent immigration 
system focused on fulfilling economic needs using both low-skilled and highly skilled 
migrants.186 Those who have a path to permanent residence or citizenship must first file a 
citizenship petition. Once the petition is approved in principle, applicants have two months 
to complete the Singapore Citizenship Journey (SCJ).187 The SCJ is mandatory to 
naturalize in Singapore, but unlike the Netherlands’ process, the research found no 
penalties for not completing the journey within the time limits if immigration status is 
valid.188 
B. FRAMEWORK FOR INTEGRATION 
The National Integration Council (NIC) manages the SCJ as one of two major 
integration policies. NIC, created in April 2009, is chaired by the minister for culture, 
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integration initiatives to facilitate social interactions between Singaporeans and 
newcomers, and raise awareness of Singapore society, norms, and values.”190 This mission 
follows a few of the EU’s principles, namely, consistent interaction and education for 
immigrants about the host country’s history, languages, and institutions. NIC’s goal is to 
build a “strong and cohesive Singapore that we are proud to call home.”191 While this stated 
goal is a bit unclear, further analysis of the policies that have been implemented 
demonstrates that Singapore’s integration goals are mostly consistent with the EU’s 
principles and the IOM’s definition. 
1. Singapore Citizenship Journey 
The SCJ represents a “collaborative process between the NIC, The People’s 
Association, and the Immigration and Checkpoints Authority in Singapore with the goals 
of enriching new citizens’ understanding of Singapore’s history and development, 
deepening the appreciation for Singaporean norms and values, and providing opportunities 
for meaningful interactions between local communities and newcomers.”192 Three 
components make up the SCJ: the e-Journey, the Singapore Experiential Tour, and the 
Community Sharing Session.193 
First, the e-Journey provides four modules of instruction that are entirely online.194 
This method allows participants to absorb the materials at their own pace.195 Moreover, 
these modules teach such things as history, notable figures, national symbols, education 
system basics, legal system basics, public transportation, housing policies, cultural norms 
of different represented populations, and the five pillars of total defense in Singapore.196 
The goal of this component is to provide general information in a digestible fashion.197 
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This portion of the SCJ exemplifies the EU’s principle that emphasizes the teaching of the 
host country’s institutions, history, and languages.198 
Next is the Singapore Experiential Tour.199 The tour is a half-day full of stops at 
historic landmarks and national institutions, where the individual can choose one of two 
options, the meeting-the-future-challenges tour or the nation-building tour.200 Some 
examples of stops along the tours include the Urban Redevelopment Authority Gallery, the 
Singapore Maritime Gallery, Memories at the Old Ford Factory, the National Museum, the 
Army Museum, and the Parliament House.201 Both of the tour options include a “Jubilee 
Walk.”202 This portion of the journey aims to provide a more detailed history of these 
landmarks while teaching the practical purposes these buildings still have for citizens.203 
This portion of the SCJ exemplifies the EU’s principles of emphasizing constant 
communication between immigrants and the host country; providing equal access to 
institutions and private and public goods; and teaching immigrants about the host country’s 
institutions, history, and languages.204 
Singapore actively engages the community in the final step of the SCJ: the 
Community Sharing Session.205 The Sharing Session is an event that allows new citizens 
to meet community grassroots leaders and other new citizens.206 It provides community 
members an opportunity to share their experiences of living in a multiracial, multireligious 
society, while also providing an opportunity for new citizens to reflect on their citizenship 
journey and convey their expectations of life in Singapore.207 This portion of the journey 
aims to introduce new citizens to other people in their new community and allows both 
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sides to learn about each other and the opportunities each brings to the community.208 This 
part of the journey helps reinforce the principle on practicing diverse cultures, including 
intercultural dialogues as well as making integration policies part of mainstream 
practice.209 
The SCJ reinforces several of the EU’s principles for integration of immigrants. 
Namely, it reinforces basic knowledge of the host society’s history and institutions, 
frequent interactions with member state citizens, and shared forums for intercultural 
dialogue. To further the work that is done during the SCJ, NIC created four national 
working groups in 2009 to concentrate on community, workplace, school, and media.210 
To create the means to support these groups, in 2009, NIC created the Community 
Integration Fund (CIF), whose role demonstrates that Singapore considers integration an 
ongoing process, even after an immigration completes the SCJ.211 The events created by 
the CIF give immigrants, natural-born citizens, and the government an opportunity to 
communicate and continue to adapt to each other. 
2. The Community Integration Fund 
The CIF “encourage[s] ground-up integration initiatives to facilitate social 
interactions and raise awareness of shared societal norms and values.”212 The CIF’s 
brochure further explains, “Underscoring the belief that integration is a two-way process, 
[the CIF] endeavor[s] to build a culture that values mutual appreciation, trust and positive 
relationships between Singaporeans and newcomers.”213 The Prime Minister’s Office—
specifically, the National Integration Council Secretariat within the National Population 
and Talent Division, Strategy Group—administers the CIF.214 The fund allocates up to 
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S$200,000 per project, allowing the CIF to sponsor other stakeholders to get involved with 
immigrants and facilitate more communication in hopes of mutual adaptation, which would 
meet the definition of integration to which Singapore, the IOM, and this thesis 
subscribes.215 
To receive funding, at least one of the objectives must be as follows: “provide 
information and resources on Singapore, encourage social interaction between locals, 
immigrants and foreigners, encourage emotional attachment to and involvement in 
Singapore or promote a positive mindset towards integration.”216 Some examples of 
acceptable projects include field trips that raise awareness of local history, sporting events, 
art exhibits, volunteer opportunities in communities, and diversity workshops.217 The 
applicants are encouraged to be creative in the types of projects they request funding for 
while remembering that integration is the major objective.218 The CIF does not support any 
projects that include profit-making, overseas trips, fund-raising, non-local purchases of 
goods and services, or cash prizes or that involve the use of tobacco and alcohol.219 The 
CIF limits its funding to events that are consistent with the EU’s principles and the IOM’s 
definitions, which strengthens communication between multiple stakeholders and 
emphasizes that integration is a repeatable, iterative process. 
The CIF reinforces the integration definition and principles because it allows for a 
dynamic, two-way process of mutual accommodation and equal access to institutions and 
public goods. The CIF also helps to make integration policies more mainstream by limiting 
the types of events that can be funded. In conclusion, the NIC uses four principles as pillars 
for integration in Singaporean society: (1) Singapore is for Singaporeans, (2) Singapore is 
a global nexus for talent and ideas, (3) Singaporeans must have open minds and hearts, and 
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(4) a united Singapore is committed to meritocracy and multiracialism.220 The NIC uses 
the aforementioned tools to achieve these principles for each new Singaporean citizen. 
C. ANALYSIS 
Given the information on Singapore, this case study received the following scores 
in each of the evaluation areas described in the research design: 
1. Employment, education, and equal access to services: 4 
2. Respect for cultures: 4 
3. Communication and participation: 4 
In applying the first set of criteria—employment, education, and equal access to 
services—Singapore earns 4 out of 5 points. Through the SCJ and integration policies, the 
city-state ensures equal access to services to those eligible for permanent residence or 
citizenship. Singaporean employment and education data were as readily available as they 
were for the EU case studies. Information on the policies that Singapore enacted for 
mainstream integration was available and exceedingly helpful in evaluating its initiatives 
under this criterion. 
The immigration system is integrally intertwined with Singapore’s national 
identity, and the government believes in “multiracialism, meritocracy and multilingualism” 
when making decisions that affect the population.221 The government of Singapore 
embraces these principles for integration and expanded them into other aspects of life for 
new citizens. For instance, in 1970, the government instituted the Ethnic Integration Policy 
for housing, which set an ethnic quota in public housing to ensure that different ethnic 
groups could learn to live together.222 This policy is significant because about 80 percent 
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of the population of Singapore lives in public housing.223 This change indicates the 
government’s priority to provide equal access for all groups.224 
Furthermore, in the 1970s, the government enacted a law that required religious 
places of worship—mosques, churches, and temples, for example—to be housed within 
the public housing units to make access to religion easier for the inhabitants.225 This status 
illustrates the government’s consideration of making diverse cultural and religious 
practices more mainstream and accessible.226 Lastly, in Singaporean politics, a Group 
Representation Scheme ensures that minority voices are heard.227 Collectively, these laws 
and policies show the effective implementation of the principle that recommends 
integration policies become mainstream policies.228 
In conclusion, Singapore’s efforts in turning integration policy into mainstream 
policy are worth praising, but given its rigid structure for admission for permanent 
residence and the barriers for migrant and temporary workers to have the same level of 
access, Singapore earns 4 out of 5 points in equal employment, education, and access to 
services. While this is a good score and the model is certainly viable for other communities 
to adopt this principle, the scope of people who are included in this model—residents and 
citizens—is small. The difference between the levels of access of temporary workers and 
permanent residents in Singapore and the effects that difference has on integration are 
topics for further research. 
In analyzing the case using the second set of criteria—respect for cultures—
Singapore fares much better, earning 4 out of 5 possible points. As in the Netherlands, 
immigrants in Singapore must learn the history, traditions, and languages used in 
Singapore, but the citizenship journey in Singapore takes a much more dynamic approach 
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in teaching these topics. The SCJ exists to welcome potential new citizens and ensure they 
understand what Singapore is, according to the government. The government not only takes 
an active role in the integration process but also partners with several grassroots groups 
and locals who welcome new Singaporeans and share their cultures with the newcomers. 
This level of involvement by multiple shareholders is important because it allows 
individuals to check the narrative that the government teaches and present different 
perspectives on life in Singapore. By having so many groups involved, each with its own 
belief sets, a system of checks and balances is organically created so that no one group 
goes unchecked in its narratives and positions. This level of involvement also indicates that 
a “dynamic, two-way process” is taking place.229 In sum, Singapore’s ability to balance the 
mandatory teaching of its history and traditions with reinforcing the narrative that 
immigrants do not have to abandon their native cultures because their native cultures help 
make Singaporean culture better earns Singapore 4 out of 5 points in respect for cultures. 
If the SCJ was not mandatory but became something every immigrant wanted to do, it 
would earn 5 out of 5 points. 
Finally, in examining the case against the communication and participation criteria, 
Singapore shows moderate success, earning 4 out of 5 points. Steps two and three of the 
SCJ encourage interaction between immigrants and Singaporeans. As previously stated, 
local groups are invited to participate in the journey and encouraged to share their stories 
with immigrants. Furthermore, the CIF shows literal buy-in on the part of the government 
to assist new citizens in feeling comfortable in their new communities. The fund allows the 
government to dictate its goals and expectations by detailing the types of projects that will 
be supported yet enables the community to work on the details and nuances to make the 
project work. This balance is important because it shows the investment by both the 
community and government. By making this investment and being clear about the 
principles and goals for integration, the government provides the resources for the people 
to take the lead and build upon those principles. This effort also demonstrates the degree 
to which the government of Singapore enables immigrants to integrate effectively. 
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Singapore also re-evaluates the citizenship journey and CIF regularly, having created 
working groups to review, assess, and improve both initiatives. The constant efforts to 
improve an already effective system earn Singapore 4 out of 5 possible points in 
communication and participation. 
What caused the deduction from a 5 to a 4 in communication and participation are 
stagnant trends in ethnic representation since 2009.230 According to the 2019 population 
brief developed by the Singaporean government, 76 percent of the population is Chinese, 
15 percent is Malay, and 7.5 percent is Indian.231 These numbers have not changed since 
2009.232 Furthermore, of the nearly 35,000 new citizens in 2019, 26,000 were Chinese, 
5,200 Malay, and 2,600 Indian.233 Although Singapore has not capped or instituted a quota 
on immigration based on ethnicity since becoming independent, the data show that the 
majority of new citizens in Singapore are Chinese.234 There is no evidence to suggest that 
Singapore considers ethnicity when evaluating individuals for citizenship, but perhaps in 
the future, the government could further incentivize other ethnicities to consider Singapore 
as a new home to expand its multicultural position beyond three ethnicities. Nevertheless, 
the SCJ, NIC, and feedback structure make Singapore an excellent model to achieve 
effective communication and participation. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Although Singapore emerged as a multicultural society from its beginning, it 
reinforces the current cultural proportions while welcoming new citizens with open arms. 
To answer the question posed at the beginning of this chapter, Singapore is doing quite 
well at following the IOM’s definition of integration. Singapore has a mandatory 
integration curriculum, like the Netherlands, in the SCJ, but unlike the Netherlands, 
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Singapore leverages members of the public and interest groups to interact directly with 
new immigrants. Furthermore, Singapore does not consider integration complete once the 
citizenship journey has concluded, as the Netherlands does once an immigrant has passed 
its exam. Singapore continues to embrace immigrants and fosters communication between 
citizens and immigrants beyond the first arrival point. Another thing that Singapore does 
well is making integration policies mainstream policies. Evidence of this approach is 
manifest in housing and religious and cultural acceptance policies throughout the country. 
One thing that cannot be overlooked in Singapore’s immigration system is the 
separate tracks and treatment of those who do not have a path to permanent residence or 
citizenship. Singapore’s construction and service industry disproportionately uses migrant 
workers, but this chapter did not delve into migrant workers’ influence in Singapore 
because such laborers cannot formally integrate into society. The influence of migrant 
workers in Singapore is a topic for further research. 
  
57 
V. DAYTON, OHIO 
Dayton, Ohio, has struggled with a history of segregation, racial discrimination, 
and an economic downturn.235 In the early 2010s, in the midst of both an economic decline 
and a dip in population count, the mayor launched the Welcome Dayton initiative to make 
Dayton more immigrant friendly and turn the economy around. The local leadership in 
Dayton leveraged the residents to create a plan that would make Dayton a desirable location 
for new immigrants. The goal was to welcome immigrants to Dayton and empower them 
to establish lives there. To accomplish this result, native-born and foreign-born residents 
began working together to understand each other better and to help make Dayton a better 
place to live. Said another way, native-born residents, foreign-born residents, and the local 
government communicated and adapted to address each other’s needs—or effectively 
integrated in accordance with the IOM. 
This chapter evaluates the effectiveness of these efforts to integrate immigrants into 
Dayton per the IOM’s definition and the EU’s principles. In this connection, this chapter 
examines the economic and social effects the Welcome Dayton initiative has had on the 
local community. It first presents the history and data to provide the reader with context of 
the city before and during the formation and implementation of the initiative. Next, it 
describes the formation and implementation of the initiative by detailing who played major 
roles and how each party implemented the strategy that formed the initiative. Finally, this 
chapter analyzes reports and surveys from Dayton and surrounding areas to measure 
whether the Welcome Dayton initiative was effective at integrating immigrants. Using 
indicators such as economic growth, housing market growth, education status, and other 
measures of social cohesion, including the percentage of people who have positive 
interactions with neighbors or police and community involvement, this thesis concludes 
that Welcome Dayton worked as a method to integrate immigrants into a locality in the 
United States. Recommendations based on what Dayton did well and what could be 
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improved are presented to better inform other local leaders who may be interested in such 
an integration program. 
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Dayton sprawls across approximately 56 miles of western Ohio and is home to 
nearly 150,000 people. The city is naturally divided by the Great Miami River. The median 
annual household income in Dayton is about $30,000.236 Because of its proximity to 
different mineral resources that were mined during the country’s industrial boom, Dayton 
was once the manufacturing hub for most of the United States.237 Dayton’s economy 
thrived with abundant manufacturing jobs until after World War II, when industry began 
to dry up and the city had to diversify its jobs in a more service industry–centered 
economy.238 
Unfortunately, Dayton has a history of racial tension and discrimination. Most of 
the city’s African American population remained on the west side of the river while the 
more affluent, majority-white population lived on the east side.239 The demographics of 
Dayton from around the time of the Civil Rights Movement until the early 2000s help to 
explain the origins of the Welcome Dayton initiative. In the summer of 1966, racial 
tensions erupted into full-fledged riots when Lester Mitchell, an African American man, 
was killed on the sidewalk in front of his apartment one night.240 Over 500 arrests and 
about $1.9 million of damage in today’s money decimated the already struggling west side 
of Dayton.241 The racial relations never really improved, and even today, both sides remain 
on their respective sides of the river.242 This context provides an example of how specific 
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events can influence a community’s attitudes for an extended time—chiefly, racial issues 
have influenced integration efforts across the United States.243 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, about 141,000 residents lived in Dayton in 
2010.244 Almost 52 percent identified as white, 42.9 percent as African American, and 
about 2.6 percent as Latino.245 These numbers are significant because around that time, 
members of the local government began hearing rumors of housing discrimination against 
Latinos in Dayton. Although the history of Dayton’s issues of housing discrimination dates 
back to the 1930s—when a rating agency, the Home Owner’s Loan Corporation, scored 
black communities lower based on “detrimental influences,” despite their good schools and 
transportation—the local government in the early 2000s had no interest in reinforcing or 
encouraging this type of treatment of residents because of its bigoted roots.246 The 
surfacing of these allegations gave local leaders an opportunity to rectify the mistakes of 
the past and ensure they would not happen again. 
The complaint about housing discrimination against Latinos was investigated and 
determined legitimate. In response, then–City Manager Tom Riordan wanted to send a 
strong message against racial discrimination and settle Dayton’s past, so he began planning 
to build an initiative to make Dayton more immigrant friendly.247 In 2010, Reverend 
Francisco Peláez-Díaz, a prominent political figure in Dayton, brought the formal 
complaints of racial discrimination in Dayton’s housing to the city’s Human Relations 
Council (HRC).248 After investigating and affirming these allegations, then–HRC Director 
Tom Wahlrab created the “immigrant friendly city (IFC) core team.”249 Once the IFC was 
convened, it was tasked with planning the Welcome Dayton initiative, aimed at not only 
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immigrants but also the entire population of Dayton to help native-born and foreign-born 
residents launch the effort. The local leaders of Dayton strived to create equal access and 
non-discriminatory practices in their locality, which is a principle of the EU, while creating 
channels for dynamic, two-way communication.250 
B. FRAMEWORK FOR INTEGRATION 
Dayton’s HRC/IFC hosted four “open conversations” between February and April 
2011 to address the situations of local immigrants in Dayton.251 The HRC invited 
individuals, not organizations, and encouraged those individuals to invite others.252 This 
type of open invitation meant that anyone could come and be heard. Over 100 people 
attended these conversations.253 The attendees were equally divided by gender and English 
fluency, and about 20 percent of attendees were foreign-born.254 These conversations 
demonstrate a dialogue between the government and attendees about how to accommodate 
each other, which is one of the EU’s principles of integration.255 The early decisions to 
involve multiple stakeholders is important as it played a role in the later success of the 
initiative. 
The setup immediately and intentionally sent the message that this initiative would 
be run by the people, not the city. The small, round tables at the event did not allow for a 
head or focal point but rather challenged the citizens to be inclusive and give everyone an 
equal stake in the conversation. There was also no “front” of the hall or stage.256 This 
particular setup prohibited an individual, presumably someone from the city, from taking 
the stage and directing the conversation. The lack of a stage sent the implicit message to 
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the participants that everyone was on the same level, and all individuals were equally 
important. 
Furthermore, the attendees of the initial discussions did not have name tags.257 This 
strategy eliminated an immediate branding of an individual—and any honor or shame that 
comes with a name tag—because the individual could not be immediately identified by a 
surname or position. By leaving out name tags, the organizers ensured that individuals 
could control what information they shared with the group, thus lessening the number of 
associations or biases they had to overcome before speaking. Due to the inclusive nature 
of the initiative—to make the city friendlier—the majority of attendees were assumed not 
to know each other, including their roles and positions in society, thus allowing for an 
organic and honest discussion. 
The meeting moderator used four personal and abstract questions to start the 
conversations among the small groups.258 These questions encouraged reflection, 
discussion, and interaction.259 The participants responded with a sense of confidence and 
responsibility for creating a more welcoming Dayton for immigrants.260 The participants 
identified how the specific experiences with immigrants, whether in professional or 
personal settings, made them feel and applied that reaction to the initiative to ensure it was 
building something that would evoke a positive reaction from their new neighbors.261 
These conversations aimed to create a plan to develop an effective written policy 
proposal on which the City Commission could vote.262 After the conversations, “fifty 
volunteers divided themselves into four subgroups: (1) business and economic 
development, (2) local government and the justice system, (3) social and health services, 
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and (4) community, culture, arts and education.”263 Each of these subcommittees 
comprised English-speaking members of the community, most of whom had lived in the 
United States for at least five years.264 Although research did not indicate that anyone was 
excluded from these conversations or the subgroups, given the above description, 
non-English speakers and new arrivals to the United States were either a small part or not 
a part of the subgroups; the reason for this choice is unclear. Given the initiative’s goal to 
“make Dayton more immigrant friendly,” it is puzzling to hear that most of the group had 
been in Dayton for at least five years. Although the people who had been in the United 
States for at least five years were new arrivals at some point, their experiences could be 
very different from those who arrived more recently. 
Each group had 90 days to create a report with recommendations for the City 
Commission to consider. The reports were completed on June 22, 2011.265 The City 
Commission held a hearing and a vote in October 2011, where a few people—who 
according to a city official, were not residents—disagreed with the proposal. They had an 
opportunity to speak to the City Commission, just as the supporters did.266 One after 
another, people walked to the podium and gave short speeches either in support of or in 
opposition to the initiative. At the end of their speeches, some offered prayers in which 
they asked the Commission to accept or reject the Welcome Dayton proposal. The City 
Commission unanimously passed the Welcome Dayton plan that month.267 The entire 
implementation approach, from the conversations, to the working groups, to the proposal 
and hearings, required participation and two-way communication to determine what 
Dayton could do to make immigrants more welcome, which concurs with the IOM’s 
definition of integration. 
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Once the Welcome Dayton initiative passed, it was time to spread awareness 
beyond concerned citizens and the volunteers who were already involved. It was time to 
involve all of Dayton. The next sections examine how the community reacted to the 
initiative from its inception through its implementation. 
1. The Use of Local Media 
The city’s commissioners used the local news outlets to applaud the efforts of the 
volunteers and express pride in their ability to develop a plan and vote it into local law.268 
The commissioners simultaneously called on individual residents to do their part by 
becoming involved and sharing their particular skills or knowledge with immigrant 
communities to make the initiative a success.269 Because only a small percentage of 
Dayton’s total population took part in one of the subgroups, by endorsing and requesting 
involvement of every resident through local news outlets, the Commission spread the 
message of the initiative to those who might not have been involved in its creation and 
increased the amount of interaction between native-born residents and immigrants. 
Evidence emerged of an initial struggle to get citizen commitment when the 
initiative passed. For example, a local news segment concluded with a poll that asked, 
“Will Dayton benefit from its Welcome to Dayton program for immigrants?” Viewers 
responded as follows: 7 percent said yes, 25 percent said only if immigrants are citizens, 
42 percent said no, and 24 percent feared an increase in illegal immigration.270 This poll is 
particularly interesting given Dayton’s unfortunate history of racial discrimination, 
including race-based riots in the 1960s, and apprehension of including new groups.271 This 
poll highlights the struggle between the direction the city leadership had pushed the people 
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people to accept that change. The next section illustrates how the Commission and the 
community began to implement the initiative. 
2. The Local Community’s Response 
Once the proposal was passed by the City Commission, some of the people of 
Dayton began working on the more than 20 recommendations incorporated into the 
development plan.272 Those recommendations included creating an international 
marketplace, providing interpreters for health and city services, and incentivizing 
civil-servant applicants who could speak multiple languages or interpret in different 
languages to English.273 For a complete list of the accepted recommendations, see the 
Appendix. These recommendations are consistent with the EU’s principle of frequent 
interactions with member state citizens, including shared forums and intercultural 
dialogue.274 These recommendations formed a roadmap for Dayton to follow toward 
effective integration. 
Understanding why Welcome Dayton enjoyed so much involvement requires 
exploring what motivated the residents to become and stay part of the initiative. Housel 
posits that the intentional recognition given to each individual during these open 
conversations led to a sense of resourcefulness, which spurred the great growth of the 
Welcome Dayton initiative in its early days.275 Rather than being pushed by the HRC or 
other city officials, individuals began to reach out to other individuals from the same city, 
but not necessarily the same community, to learn from and collaborate with one another.276 
These individuals decided to respond in a way that helped bring Dayton closer to its goal 
of making the city more immigrant friendly, and in the meantime, effective integration was 
taking place. 
 
272 City of Dayton, Human Relations Council, Welcome Dayton: Immigrant Friendly City (Dayton, 
OH: City of Dayton, 2011), http://www.welcomedayton.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Welcome-
Dayton-immigrant-friendly-report-final.pdf. 
273 City of Dayton, Human Relations Council. 
274 Council of the European Union, “2618th Council Meeting.”  
275 Housel, Saxen, and Wahlrab, “Experiencing Intentional Recognition.” 
276 Housel, Saxen, and Wahlrab. 
65 
One example of this effective outreach and collaboration was manifest in Dayton’s 
artist community. Although one of the subgroups during the planning stages was 
“community, culture, arts and education,” it never specifically planned an event or set an 
expectation of production from the community. Instead, artists took it upon themselves to 
create pieces that were welcoming.277 They began to collaborate to create music and 
paintings and provide dancing lessons, all with the mission to be more welcoming and 
inclusive. An arts organization called CityFolk in Dayton focused on immigrant groups 
and tied those groups directly to the Welcome Dayton initiative. CityFolk began reaching 
out to different immigrant groups and international artists, asking them to share their talents 
and their cultures with schoolchildren and at community events.278 This example shows 
the citizens of Dayton and immigrants engaging in an shared intercultural forum, consistent 
with the EU’s guidelines.279 This example is significant because it did not use any 
government support and validates the argument that integration is a societal project, not 
just a transaction between a government and an immigrant. 
Soon after launching the initiative, the community began hosting movie nights, 
soccer tournaments, cooking lessons, and other cultural events geared toward educating 
individuals about cultures with which they might not be familiar. These outreach efforts 
were used as a means to introduce the attendees to the Welcome Dayton initiative. Another 
example of residents being resourceful was a group of local musicians who gathered other 
local musicians from different cultures to compose and create songs and music videos that 
highlighted the talents of different immigrant musicians from within Dayton’s city 
limits.280 Planning all of these culturally diverse events took coordination and 
communication, which highlight the importance of these examples. The people 
communicated effectively enough to get those events off the ground and learn from one 
another. 
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Two music videos produced under this creative initiative—“Where the Rivers 
Meet” and “Where There Is Love”—exemplify inclusive messaging.281 Both videos were 
filmed around the city of Dayton. The title “Where the Rivers Meet” directly challenges 
those who may still harbor the segregationist beliefs of past Daytonians while “Where 
There Is Love” challenges the audience to adopt an attitude of acceptance and welcome 
strangers. The people who are emphasized in these music videos are very different from 
the news segment. Although almost every person in the aforementioned news segment, 
except for one man, appeared to be Caucasian, speak English, and dress in traditional 
American formalwear, the music videos feature people of different races and ethnicities, 
not always speaking English, dressed in either less-formal attire or traditional clothing from 
their culture, and sharing other parts of their culture such as instruments or dances. This 
product suggests the initiative shifted the narrative to be more welcoming. The different 
styles of clothing and languages allow different immigrant groups to feel accepted and 
welcome to maintain their identities within their original group while also becoming part 
of the broader Welcome Dayton group, which is consistent with the IOM’s definition and 
the EU’s principle for integration. 
The lyrics of the songs recognize the struggles individuals might have experienced 
up to that point and also reinforce the idea that Dayton is now their home. The song “Where 
the Rivers Meet” ends with the following lines: “We all came here from somewhere, we 
all came here from somewhere else, we all came here from somewhere, and we are all 
coming home.”282 This lyric resonates as the camera pans over a park in Dayton, full of the 
people previously described. These words are sung by a woman who appears to be African 
American; that fact is significant given Dayton’s history of segregation. It is a direct 
message to African Americans in Dayton that they should also feel at home there. 
Moreover, it puts those who may still hold the beliefs of old Dayton on notice—that Dayton 
is integrating, and they are now the minority. 
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3. Law Enforcement Involvement 
Throughout the development, approval, and implementation of Welcome Dayton, 
law enforcement feared that it could not do its job effectively because verifying a person’s 
identity might be perceived as “unwelcoming.” Both Chief Richard Biehl of the Dayton 
Police Department and the mayor addressed this concern.283 To balance the need to identify 
the people they were interacting with and the directive to be more welcoming of 
immigrants, the City of Dayton began accepting identification cards from Mexico and 
Guatemala in 2005.284 The city approved the plan to accept these IDs after a coalition of 
ethnic and cultural identity representatives from across the state spent 17 months 
convincing the city’s agencies to accept the them, assuring the agencies that the vetting 
process at those consulates was sufficient. The Dayton Police Department also stopped 
asking immigration status–related questions to witnesses, victims, and some minor, mostly 
traffic, violators. 
By accepting the foreign identification cards and not asking immigration-related 
questions, the police showed the people of Dayton a good faith effort to build trust with 
the community and make it safer, not to enforce federal immigration laws. The police also 
showed they were willing to communicate with the community and adjust their practices 
to meet the needs of the people they served. According to the police chief, by creating a 
sense of trust among the immigrant population and the police, they were able to build a 
productive relationship, whereby both sides could call on each other for support.285 This 
policy change is a good example of one consistent with the IOM’s definition that 
integration is a dynamic, two-way practice of mutual accommodation.286 Additionally, the 
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police narrowed their focus of duties and reorganized their priorities to make sure the safety 
of the streets of Dayton was the top priority.287 
Since the launch of Welcome Dayton in October 2011, Chief Biehl has lectured 
across the country and even testified before the U.S. House of Representatives. His 
message is consistent: the Dayton Police Department’s decision to stop questioning the 
immigration status of victims and witnesses of crime, to stop arresting people the first time 
they are caught driving without a valid license, and to provide specialized training in how 
to ask someone about their immigration status has led to an increase in trust among the 
community and the police. In sum, the police and the community effectively communicate 
with each other and have adapted to each other’s needs. 
Furthermore, the Dayton Police Department initiated outreach programs to 
immigrant communities to explain different immigration options available to those seeking 
help from law enforcement. Police officers are also trained on when and how to inquire 
about an individual’s immigration status and when to alert Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement.288 This type of outreach and training builds the trust of individuals and 
communities, so they can become part of the residents who support the initiative. These 
actions are a positive response from the police in the effort to make Dayton more immigrant 
friendly while balancing law enforcement responsibilities, yet another example of 
following the principles of effective integration by engaging in a mutually accommodating 
dialogue.289 When considering a model for policing policies related to integration, Dayton 
Police Department is the gold standard. 
4. Local Leadership’s Role 
Former Dayton Mayor Gary Leitzell and the city’s commissioners played a pivotal 
role in the inception, development, passing, and growth of the Welcome Dayton initiative. 
Leitzell’s statements throughout the early days of Welcome Dayton made it clear that 
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federal immigration laws still applied in Dayton.290 The distinction between legal and 
illegal immigration was crucial. Mayor Leitzell did not announce that just any immigrant 
was welcome; instead, he made a point of announcing that federal immigration laws still 
applied and that the goal of the program was citizenship.291 The mayor made it clear to 
federal authorities that Dayton adhered to federal immigration laws and remained 
supportive of the initiative. By stating on a national news outlet that the goal of the program 
was citizenship, the mayor reminded local constituents of his expectations while making 
himself accountable to a national audience. 
The mayor gave a different speech to a local audience. On the same local news 
segment mentioned earlier, from the night the initiative was passed, the mayor stated “that 
the enforcement of federal immigration laws would be left to federal law enforcement and 
the initiative would focus on treating all people kindly, fairly, and humanely.”292 The 
mayor played a vastly different role in each segment. He went from a position of power in 
Dayton with support from the people of Dayton to an exception to the rule and possible 
rebel. He went from declaring what the policy would be in Dayton to suggesting what it 
could be nationwide. Similar to the citizens who came to the commissioners’ hearing 
before the vote with a statement and a prayer, the mayor was looking to inform or influence 
the national audience. He also built in a significant caveat with the distinction between 
legal and illegal immigration on national news while being inclusive of all on the local 
news. The mayor’s efforts to inform all Daytonians of the program’s goals and the laws to 
be enforced exemplifies a local leader developing clear goals and indicators consistent with 
the EU’s principles.293 
C. ANALYSIS 
Given the information on Dayton, this case study received the following scores in 
each of the evaluation areas described in the research design: 
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1. Employment, education, and equal access to services: 4 
2. Respect for cultures: 4 
3. Communication and participation: 5 
In analyzing the first set of criteria—employment, education, and equal access to 
services—Dayton has a large foreign-born population who is employed and well educated; 
thus, Dayton earns 4 out of 5 points. According to a report released by the Welcome Dayton 
initiative in consultation with the New American Economy, Dayton has had the greatest 
per capita increase of a foreign-born population in the United States since 2000.294 
Dayton’s immigration rate increased by 40.3 percent in 2013, compared to Ohio’s 7 percent 
and the greater country’s 13.4 percent increase.295 
Foreign-born Daytonians also pay state and local taxes to the tune of over $15 
million and have a spending power of more than $115 million.296 In 2014, 
immigrant-owned businesses had more than a $500 million economic impact in the state 
of Ohio.297 As for influence on the labor market, between 2007 and 2012, the number of 
workers who were foreign-born increased 23.2 percent, and immigrants were twice as 
likely to be entrepreneurs than native-born residents.298 In education, 17 percent of foreign-
born Daytonians have bachelor’s degrees while 10 percent of native-born residents have 
them.299 As for advanced degrees, 5.4 percent of foreign-born Daytonians have them, 
compared to 3.7 percent of native-born residents.300 The increase in educated and 
employed immigrants is consistent with the principles that education and employment are 
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crucial and could be indicators of successful integration.301 However, children make up 
about one-third of the foreign-born population in Dayton.302 In 2013, there were 725 
limited English proficient students in Dayton schools, representing 35 countries and 25 
languages.303 These figures indicate that work still needs to be done regarding the education 
of immigrant children, consistent with the education principle from the EU.304 As 
immigrant employment and education numbers both recently increased dramatically, but 
immigrant children in Dayton may still need help learning English, Dayton earns 4 of 5 
possible points in employment, education, and equal access to services. In conclusion, the 
data prove that Dayton is a great model to follow to achieve effective levels of employment, 
education, and access to services. It will also valuable to observe Dayton’s handling of 
English education for children in the future to see whether it is worthy of modeling. 
In examining the second set of criteria—respect for cultures—Dayton is successful 
and, as such, earns 4 out of 5 points. The Welcome Dayton initiative has focused on making 
the city more immigrant friendly, which includes embracing diverse cultures and religions. 
Dayton holds multiple events to encourage immigrants and native-born Daytonians to share 
their cultural backgrounds and practices. The artist community is a great example of a 
group that ensures everyone’s culture is celebrated. The community invites musicians from 
all backgrounds to take part in its projects, bring instruments from their home countries, 
and wear the clothes they would wear in their original home. 
Despite a few examples of people who did not want to make Dayton a culturally 
diverse place during the initial hearings, examples of Daytonians embracing people and 
things from all cultures abound. The number of working groups and community-developed 
events shows a commitment to recognizing each individual’s culture and religion, earning 
Dayton 4 out of 5 points in respect for cultures. Some evidence in the surveys indicate that 
certain individuals in the area did not want immigrants in Dayton, and the presence of such 
dissenters, consistent with other case studies, means Dayton could not earn 5 out of 5 
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points. In sum, Dayton’s model emphasizes the importance of respect for cultures, even 
though some do not agree. Dayton does an excellent job acknowledging all opinions while 
continuing to focus on pushing a narrative that encourages everyone to respect each other’s 
cultures and, in turn, be more welcoming. 
In applying the third set of criteria—communication and participation—Dayton is 
successful, and earns 5 out of 5, accordingly. Dayton has structured the Welcome Dayton 
initiative around frequent interactions and is constantly reassessing its programs to make 
the city more immigrant friendly. Local leaders in Dayton initiate the working groups so 
that multiple parties can get involved and have their opinions heard. From the initial 
meetings, to the approval hearing, to the implementation and feedback gathering, 
communication is encouraged. Dayton’s mayor stated publicly that the goal of Welcome 
Dayton was citizenship—to be consistent with national integration goals. In the two years 
following Welcome Dayton’s launch, the percentage of eligible immigrants who 
naturalized went from 53 percent to 57 percent.305 Immigrants are not just naturalizing; 
they are also staying in Dayton. The percentage of immigrants who lived in Dayton longer 
than one year increased from 64 percent in 2007 to 79 percent in 2012.306 The increase in 
the number of immigrants naturalizing and staying in Dayton is a measurable and useful 
when evaluating the program, in accordance with the EU’s principle on evaluation.307 
In February 2014, the Center for Urban and Public Affairs at Wright State 
University released a report based on a survey from November and December 2013 of 
native-born residents about the effects of Welcome Dayton.308 The survey found that 67 
percent of respondents agree that immigrants make the community a better place to live.309 
Moreover, 63 percent of residents believe immigrants are beneficial to the economy, but 
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44 percent believe immigrants have taken jobs away from people in Dayton.310 Finally, 14 
percent of those surveyed believe immigrants increase crime rates.311 These conflicting 
results are puzzling. 
The city issued several reports and surveys in an effort to measure the success of 
Welcome Dayton.312 These reports and surveys are important because they show the areas 
where Dayton is succeeding in integrating immigrants and where it is not. Dayton 
understands the need for constant re-evaluation and improvement, which has earned it 5 
out of 5 points in communication and participation. Dayton is an excellent model to follow 
to achieve effective communication and participation because it understands the 
importance of two-way communication, feedback, and clear messaging as a comprehensive 
approach to communication. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The Welcome Dayton initiative is a complex web of social interactions that led to 
a social movement and contributed to saving what was otherwise regarded a dying city. 
One challenge in adopting the Welcome Dayton approach has been that the initiative was 
never meant to hit an end point or have a “mission accomplished” moment. Its purpose is 
to motivate citizens to be more welcoming of each other, regardless of immigration status. 
There are currently no established metrics to gauge the success of the Welcome initiatives. 
Both the theory and the program are meant to be constantly re-evaluated and modified 
through surveys and policy initiatives. This initiative follows the general position that 
immigrant integration is never finished but rather is a process that constantly needs to be 
re-evaluated and improved.313 
The effects of the Welcome Dayton initiative on the city of Dayton can only be 
appreciated once there is a full understanding of the events that led to its inception and the 
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methods that were used to foster the ideas that led to the initiative. A community leader 
challenged the local government to address racial discrimination in Dayton. The local 
government responded by proposing a plan to transform Dayton into a multicultural city. 
To make Dayton a multicultural city, officials relied on their community to build and foster 
relationships that led to a more understanding, kinder community. Reversing Dayton’s 
history of exclusion and embracing a new sense of inclusion required dedication not only 
from community organizers but everyday citizens and even political leadership. Dayton is 
effectively integrating immigrants. 
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VI. ANALYSIS, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This thesis aspired to explore and analyze different methods of integration and 
develop recommendations for local leaders in the United States who are interested in 
integrating immigrants into their localities. To that end, this author researched and analyzed 
the integration policies and programs of four different case studies and measured the level 
of effectiveness of each using the IOM’s definition of integration and the EU’s guiding 
principles on integrating immigrants.314 In an effort to measure the effectiveness, this thesis 
categorized the principles into broader categories and assigned a value to each case study 
based on how effective it was at incorporating the principles within the categories. This 
chapter provides a comparative analysis of each of the case studies, presents findings, and 
offers recommendations for local leaders in the United States to integrate immigrants into 
their localities more effectively. 
A. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
While each of these case studies is from a different country or locality with different 
laws and government structure it is important to highlight the similarities and differences 
in an effort to find a middle ground that can be applied at the local level in the United 
States. Each case study did something slightly different, and the data highlighted the effects 
of those differences. This thesis does not claim that these specific programs or policies are 
the only or direct cause for changes in the data but rather that the programs and policies 
can play a role in changes to the data. Figure 6 provides a visual representation of how each 
case study scored in the selected criteria. 
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Figure 6. Scores by Category for Each Case Study 
As the graph demonstrates, most case studies scored between 3 and 4 points in 
education, employment, and equal access. Canada, Singapore, and Dayton tied for the 
highest score while the Netherlands scored the lowest. The difference between the 
Canadian and the Dutch approach is that Canada is using pilot programs to bring in people 
who are already hirable and educated to fill a need already identified. There was no 
evidence that the Netherlands has worked with any local officials or corporations to 
identify needs at the local level. Furthermore, Canada passed laws to ensure equal access 
to services for immigrants from the point of arrival; on the other hand, the Netherlands has 
focused more on integrating immigrants to become Dutch citizens. Singapore is also 
noteworthy here because it provided great examples of how integration policy became 
mainstream policy. Dayton also scored 4 points in this category because of the rapid growth 
in foreign-born people working and because a larger percentage of foreign-born 
Daytonians have bachelor’s and advanced degrees than native-born Daytonians 
As for the respect for cultures category, all four case studies scored a 3 or higher, 
indicating they are all moderately successful. Canada, Singapore, and Dayton were the 
most successful because they had clear messaging from leadership not only to accept but 
also to encourage people to practice their cultures and religions, no matter how different 
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they are. Dayton’s initiative centered on making immigrants feel more welcome in Dayton, 
and one way it accomplished that goal was by encouraging religious and cultural practices. 
The Netherlands case was interesting in this category because it has been successful at 
teaching immigrants the Dutch language, history, and traditions, but the classes are 
mandatory, as they are in Singapore. Unlike Singapore, however, the Netherlands has not 
created a balance whereby immigrants can share their experiences with the government 
and other Dutch people—the Singapore Citizenship Journey does succeed along this line. 
This category was not about who could best teach the language, traditions, and cultures to 
immigrants but rather who could balance teaching the host country’s subjects with creating 
room for new cultures and religions. 
Finally, the communication and participation category proved to have the greatest 
disparity among the case studies, with Canada and Dayton earning 5 and the Netherlands 
earning 2. The Netherlands was not successful here because it did not foster frequent 
interaction among its stakeholders, other than through mandatory interactions; it did not 
recognize that integration is an ongoing process; and it did not have an active feedback and 
re-evaluation process. Dayton, on the other hand, has fostered frequent interaction from the 
beginning via working groups and community events. Dayton leadership and the 
community recognize that integration is a process, and they have issued and participated 
in several surveys and reports designed to measure the success of the integration processes 
and policies that were instituted in Dayton. It is interesting, however, that both the 
Netherlands and Dayton have the same integration goal—to create more citizens—but the 
methods they have chosen to reach those goals could not be more different. Canada also 
leverages local partners and uses pilots such as the PNP to ensure that each stakeholder is 
taking responsibility for its share of the integration effort. Canada has also shown evidence 
that foreign-born Canadians are participating in the democratic process, which is part of 
the EU’s principles included in this category. 
In sum, each case study offers ideas for how host societies and immigrants might 
adapt to their new partners and highlights how complex integration can be. The following 




Whether it be a national- or local-level case study, each case offers several lessons 
from other leaders in developing integration policies or implementing integration 
programs. This section focuses on broad findings for local leaders. It became clear through 
the case studies that the more the governments and immigrants engaged in mutual 
adaptation, the more likely the immigrant population was to be employed and educated, 
which is consistent with the IOM’s definition. Furthermore, the more a government 
engaged in two-way dialogue with other stakeholders, such as corporations, community 
leaders, law enforcement personnel, and immigrant groups, the more likely those 
immigrants were to participate in their new society by buying property in the area, starting 
businesses, voting, and assuming the host country’s national identity. 
The first finding is that the integration process has no end. If integration is 
considered complete, either party can disengage, and the communication can slow or stop, 
causing the end of mutual adaptation. For example, the Netherlands created a system that 
has a clear start and finish line. Furthermore, its curriculum is mandatory and only involves 
the immigrant’s completing a checklist provided by the government. In return, the 
immigrant learns whatever is part of the curriculum and then receives a certificate of 
completion. Moreover, Dutch immigrants are punished if they do not complete the 
curriculum, and they are not provided with much guidance in how to navigate the 
government’s process, let alone given a voice in adapting the process. This type of one-
way communication does not lend itself toward effective mutual adaptation but rather 
mandates conforming to a certain set of criteria or minimum qualifications. 
Similarly, Singapore also has a mandatory integration process in the SCJ. While 
the citizenship journey is technically complete after the third step, Singapore is more 
effective at communicating and adapting throughout the process in an effort to leave 
immigrants feeling as if they could communicate further with the people and organizations 
they met along the journey. Singapore has been able to leverage the community a bit more 
than the Netherlands has, while keeping a structured curriculum with a completion point. 
The SCJ includes several structured activities as well as unstructured activities, which 
allow immigrants to learn at their own pace and engage other community members to 
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gather the information they need. Furthermore, the SCJ is a showcase of all that Singapore 
has to offer immigrants, not to mention it teaches new immigrants about Singapore’s past 
and belief system. Most importantly, Singapore leverages local groups and funds initiatives 
by citizens to foster a relationship between new immigrants and settled Singaporean 
citizens. The communication from these types of relationships is vital in the mutual 
adaptation that is integration. In sum, there is nothing wrong with making integration 
programs mandatory; however, communication throughout the mandatory portion is key. 
The host government can also institute continuing integration practices that extend beyond 
the basic curriculum, as Singapore, Canada, and Dayton have done. Each of these case 
studies have leveraged other stakeholders to hold events or take responsibility for 
communicating with immigrants and assisting them in adjusting to their new locales. 
The next finding is that the more stakeholders engaging in the integration process, 
the better. Canada is a great example of effective communication between multiple 
stakeholders, namely, the federal government, the provincial government, corporations, 
and immigrants. The federal government has retained its function as the primary gatekeeper 
for admission to Canada yet allows the provinces to address needs they may have regarding 
immigration. The PNP is an example of multilevel communication between federal and 
provincial governments, provincial governments and corporations, and individual 
immigrants and government entities and corporations. The PNP allows Canada, at the 
federal level, to follow its guiding principle of being welcoming of immigrants and the 
provincial government to bring in qualified immigrants to address needs it may have in its 
society and labor market. The PNP allows corporations to bring in the most qualified 
immigrants to fill vacancies in their corporations. Finally, it gives immigrants who want to 
be part of Canadian society an opportunity to live and work in Canada. Also, provincial 
governments can negotiate with corporations to act as sponsors of sorts to help new 
employees adjust to life in Canada in return for provincial-level perks such as tax breaks 
or incentives. Canada’s ability to leverage this multilevel system of communication to 
create a more educated, more employed nation makes it an excellent case study.  
Dayton, too, is a superb example of what can happen when there is clear two-way 
communication and buy-in from almost every level of a community. From the mayor and 
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commissioners to the local artists, all agreed that Dayton needed to be more immigrant 
friendly. After a rocky history of racial prejudice, Dayton’s community leaders spoke to 
local politicians and began developing a program to accomplish their goal. What Dayton 
has done that the other case studies have not involves the leaders’ providing broad guidance 
and then turning the project over to the community to determine the best path forward. The 
community built the working groups. The community built the relationships with new 
immigrants. The community built the initiative from the ground up. Once the initiative was 
built, the government stepped back in to weigh and vote on the initiative. The initiative 
assigned both the government and the community with important tasks, and both sides got 
to work. Meanwhile, some people were not interested in the initiative, and the Commission 
heard their perspectives, too, before the vote. Dayton effectively divided tasks and 
priorities so that everyone—whether immigrant, citizen, artist, government official, law 
enforcement leadership, police officer, or politician—took responsibility for its success. 
Throughout the implementation process, everyone listened to feedback from each 
other, which allowed the initiative to pivot policies and funds to address the most pressing 
needs. Dayton’s mayor sent a clear message that this was a community-wide initiative. 
Data suggest that immigrants are deciding to stay in Dayton after settling there; indeed, 
they are buying homes and working in Dayton. The Welcome Dayton initiative has created 
a mechanism for mutual adaptation and two-way communication between the government, 
citizens, and immigrants in Dayton. Singapore, too, has been effective at leveraging local 
groups to work with the government in the SCJ. Singapore has also offered the CIF to help 
local leaders and interested citizens engage with immigrants at the government’s expense. 
In sum, Canada, Dayton, and Singapore are examples of the multilevel 
communication and responsibility that are necessary to create effective integration 
programs in accordance with the IOM’s definition. The Canadian government engages its 
stakeholders before immigrants arrive and remains engaged through their arrival. Dayton’s 
government engages its stakeholders to create and manage its integration policies and 
programs. Singapore’s government engages its stakeholders during the SCJ and afterward 
through the CIF. All three localities have made an effort to adopt integration policies as 
mainstream policies—Canada through its pilot programs to make immigrants a bigger part 
81 
of Canadian society, Singapore through the passing of laws that allow for different 
religious institutions to be available in housing complexes, and Dayton by accepting 
identification cards from different countries as if they were the same as IDs from the United 
States. 
The final finding is that Canada, Singapore, and Dayton all have made an effort to 
re-evaluate their programs and policies after a certain period while the Netherlands seems 
to pass new laws every few years as a way to rewrite the integration policies, usually 
making them more restrictive for the immigrant. Canada, Singapore, and Dayton have 
created working groups, developed and distributed surveys, gathered feedback, and made 
changes to their original policies and programs, without a complete overhaul. This 
re-evaluation is the type of two-way communication and mutual adaptation that creates an 
effective system of integration. While the Netherlands quantifies its integration program’s 
success with exam certificates, the other cases use qualitative methods to evaluate and 
iterate their programs. 
All three programs have dates set to re-evaluate their programs. The ability to 
continuously give and receive feedback with stakeholders is what makes integration 
effective. In each of these case studies, the host country changed its needs several times in 
a short period. In order to effectively address these changes, the integration programs 
needed to change as well. For example, Canada re-evaluates the PNP annually and works 
with provincial partners, which work with the corporations to ensure the labor market is 
stable in that province. If the province states a need for a certain type of worker, the federal 
government can address that need via the PNP. Furthermore, Dayton consistently sends 
out surveys to its population to poll their positions on integration. The government can then 
adjust funding and resources based on those responses. One example of that adjustment is 
the recent expansion of interpreter services at government facilities in Dayton, which is a 
worthy investment in ensuring communication between immigrants who struggle with 
English and staff. Singapore recently published a qualitative review of its integration 
policies that consists of feedback from citizens and immigrants about what worked well 
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and what could be better.315 The review reemphasizes the government’s commitment to 
the IOM’s definition of integration and provides stakeholders with an update on the 
programs in place. It also invites more feedback and help in planning the next version of 
integration policies and programs in Singapore. 
In conclusion, the case studies that focus on improving the existing programs and 
policies based on feedback solicited from stakeholders are more effectively integrating 
immigrants. They are more successful because they are endorsing and acting upon the 
two-way communication model that is the definition of successful integration per the IOM. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
These findings include strategies that local leaders in the United States might or 
might not be able to use because of the way the U.S. immigration system is structured. The 
U.S. immigration system is largely controlled by the federal government. Federal 
authorities dictate who may enter and remain in the United States, but state and local 
governments have a significant say in what happens to individuals once they enter the 
United States. The relationship between federal, state, and local powers regarding 
immigration is a topic for another thesis; for the purposes of integration, however, local 
leaders need to know the point at which applicable federal laws and their priorities diverge 
and need to weigh the interest in developing a policy or program that may cost federal 
support. 
Local leaders are the ones who largely determine what happens to the citizens in 
their locality on a daily basis. As long as localities are following federal laws, federal 
authorities will not interfere with their initiatives—immigration is no different. In order to 
create and maintain an effective integration policy or program at the local level, a local 
leader should consider the following: 
 
315 Council of the European Union, “2618th Council Meeting.” 
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1. Create an integration curriculum for new immigrants and a 
continuing integration program for those who have completed the 
first curriculum 
This recommendation models Singapore, whose case scored 4 out of 5 in respect 
for cultures and communication and participation. Creating an integration program similar 
to Singapore’s allows immigrants to learn the basics of the host locality, while also giving 
new immigrants an opportunity to communicate with several other stakeholders in a 
constructive, non-adversarial manner. Whether the program is mandatory or not is up to 
the locality, but if it is mandatory, the locality needs to consider whether to sanction 
immigrants who do not comply and what chilling effect those sanctions may have on an 
immigrant population. 
The continuing integration program should begin promptly after the completion of 
the initial course but be optional. Immigrants who need more assistance or want to engage 
with the same stakeholders further may enroll. The focus of the continuing integration 
program should be to make integration policy more mainstream. The program should 
mimic the model used to create the Welcome Dayton initiative by creating a neutral 
environment where everyone feels comfortable to speak and engage. While creating an 
environment that fosters effective communication, local leaders should also supply the 
means to make the ideas produced in these programs a reality, whether that be through 
funding or passing an ordinance or law. 
In sum, the mutual adaptation process should include several integration courses 
that allow immigrants and stakeholders to engage on a deeper level, beyond a few hours or 
a basic awareness course. Furthermore, the local leaders need to provide a way for the 
policies or programs developed in these courses to affect the community at large and enable 
the policies that come from these courses to become the policies and programs of the  
larger community. 
2. Engage with as many stakeholders as possible as early and often as 
possible 
This recommendation models Canada and Dayton, whose cases scored 5 out of 5 
in communication and participation. Local leaders should engage immediately with as 
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many stakeholders as possible. The case studies have shown that working groups can be 
used to great effect. The working groups can act as a liaison between the stakeholders and 
the local leaders and should consist of members from every interested group. The working 
groups should be tasked with working toward a goal, such as making the area more 
immigrant friendly or stimulating the local population to embrace the local identity. 
The opportunity to create effective multilevel communication was pivotal in all of 
the case studies. The localities that engaged more stakeholders created and developed 
policies that addressed the populations effectively. The Canadian government, for 
example, engaged with local governments, corporations, and immigrants to address the 
needs of each party. The success of addressing those needs was clear in the OECD’s 
numbers, which showed very little difference in the natural-born and foreign-born 
populations across several categories. The similarity in these figures suggests that both 
groups have mutually adapted—or integrated into one society—which helps to explain why 
the percentage of the population that identifies as Canadian is so high. 
Local leaders can engage in a similar manner with its local stakeholders and federal 
partners, as Dayton did. Strong messaging from local leaders is essential to ensuring the 
stakeholders all know the intent and goals of the integration policies and procedures.  
Then, the working groups can stimulate the community and stakeholders to participate. 
Through that participation, integration policies and programs are developed, and then  
the local leaders can get involved again to provide the resources necessary to implement 
those programs. 
3. Be clear that integration policy continues in the locality, requiring a 
constant improvement process to make the locality the best it can be 
This recommendation models Canada and Dayton, whose cases scored 5 out of 5 
in communication and participation. Local leaders should ensure that everyone understands 
integration is an iterative process that will change as the needs of the community, including 
the immigrants, change. While there can be progress indicators and evaluation tools in 
place throughout the process, their purpose is not to weed out those who are struggling but 
to reassess the effectiveness of the policies and programs and address any issues within 
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them. By making integration policies part of mainstream policies and constantly requesting 
feedback, all of the stakeholders in the integration process can feel responsible for its 
success. 
Dayton and Canada were effective at soliciting feedback and adjusting the 
programs based on that feedback. While Singapore and the Netherlands have a concrete 
finish line in the integration process, the Netherlands also has the largest gaps between 
foreign-born and native-born citizens in the OECD’s data. As shown with Dayton, local 
leaders can be clear about a goal in integrating immigrants, such as citizenship or long-
term residence, but just because a locality achieves that goal does not mean the process 
will stop. The process will continue to adjust based on the needs of the community. 
Ultimately, these recommendations should all work simultaneously to create a 
system of mutual adaptation between all stakeholders in a community, including 
government leaders, government workers, non-governmental organizations, corporations, 
native-born citizens, and immigrants. The process should be constantly evaluated and 
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